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Designation of Markets and Dominance in Telecommunications Sector Regulation and the related report

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INTRODUCTION

DEFINITIONS

2. DEFINITIONS

The terms and expressions identified herein shall have the same meanings stipulated in the Act and the Bylaw unless the context requires otherwise. Furthermore, the following words and expressions shall have the meanings assigned thereto:

2-1 “Act": The Telecommunications and Information Technology Act.

2-2 “Bylaw": The Implementing Regulations of the Telecommunications and Information Technology Act.

2-3 “Classification Decision": A decision issued by CST to designate and classify Telecommunications Markets under dominance or with service providers who have Significant Market Power, classify one or more service providers as having Significant Market Power or dominating this market or markets, and set ex-ante regulation necessary to be applied to the Dominant Service Provider in order to limit dominance practices before they occur (Ex-ante).

2-4 “Dominance": Dominance is a capacity for acting independently in a market that is a result of the circumstances of the market and the position in the market of one or more service providers.

2-5 “Dominant Service Provider": The service provider classified as Dominant Service Provider in the Classification Decision issued by CST pursuant to the standards outlined in Article (‎‎4) hereof.

2-6 “MDDD Report": Market definition, designation and dominance report

2-7 “Regulatory Requirements Following the Occurrence of an Incident (Ex-post)": Regulatory actions applied to the service provider if it commits an anti-competitive behavior.

2-8 “Regulatory Requirements to Limit Dominance Practices Before They Occur (Ex-ante)": The specific requirements imposed by CST on a Dominant Service Provider in a specific Telecommunications Market to avoid, prevent, or nullify the effect of dominance and other anti-competitive practices; and to protect users in this market as described in Article (‎7) hereof.

2-9 “Significant Market Power" The ability to restrict output, raise prices, reduce quality, or otherwise act, to a significant extent, independently of competitive market forces.

2-10 “Telecommunications Market": All services provided through the telecommunications networks of licensed service providers (including infrastructure providers and services adjacent and ancillary to Telecommunications Markets such as, without limitation, Over-The-Top (OTT), Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), the Internet of Things (IoT), cybersecurity and data protection services).

2-11 “Affiliated Entity": Any entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, another entity, where control means the ability to exercise a decisive influence over the strategic, financial, or operational decisions of the entity, whether through ownership, voting rights, contractual arrangements, or otherwise.

SCOPE OF REGULATION

ISSUANCE PROCEDURES OF THE “MARKET DEFINITION, DESIGNATION AND DOMINANCE (MDDD) REPORT” AND THE “CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS”

DESIGNATING AND CLASSIFYING RELEVANT MARKETS IN THE REPORT

5. DESIGNATING AND CLASSIFYING RELEVANT MARKETS IN THE REPORT

5-1 The Market Definition, Designation and Dominance (MDDD) Report must include CST’s stance on all or some Telecommunications Markets to which CST is considering applying ex-ante regulation. The report may be limited to one or more geographic markets, or one or more telecommunications services.

5-2 CST shall define and designate one or more specific Telecommunications Markets in order to identify which markets would be potential for ex-ante regulation by assessing a set of best practice market standards and methodologies, including the following:

5-2-1 CST will evaluate if the retail markets can be competitive without regulations for the wholesale markets, to determine if the market is suitable for consideration for potential ex-ante regulations.

5-2-2 CST will define the markets based on a product market definition to reflect current trends and potential evolution.

5-2-3 CST will continuously monitor and review the markets’ periodic performance and analyze their trends.

5-2-4 CST will consider the effect of the bundling of the non-telecommunication related services, that may provide a service provider with more power in the market (such as, loyalty programs and partnerships with other companies not operating in the telecommunications industry).

5-2-5 CST will analyze telecommunications services forming one market, the group of users concerned with such services, and the geographic area of this market. These classifications encompass various sub markets in both retail and wholesale.

5-2-6 Markets will be built up on the grouping of services and infrastructure they are based on. If new services do not fall within existing markets, no presumption of dominance will apply.

5-2-7 There may be a specific infrastructure provider markets that will be evaluated separately in the product/service; these will be evaluated in the geographic areas defined. Infrastructure provider markets will be considered as sub-markets for each of the highly defined markets.

5-2-8 CST may split the Telecommunications Markets into separate sub markets for Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) and Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), depending on the characteristics and conditions of competition in each sub-market, such as the degree of differentiation, substitution, and interdependence between the services offered by MNOs and MVNOs. Separately, CST may also consider analyzing the Telecommunications Markets with or without accounting for the presence and impact of MVNOs.

5-3 Once the relevant product markets have been identified, CST will assess and define the relevant geographic markets’ dimensions and segmentation and may classify markets at the national, regional, or subregional level in order to determine the competitive conditions for each market. CST will define the relevant geographic markets as areas where the concerned entities are engaged in the supply and demand of pertinent products or services, and where the conditions of competition are uniformly consistent. CST will review the geographic market segmentation periodically, adjusting to technological changes and market developments that may affect the spatial layout of telecommunication infrastructures and the availability and substitutability of products or services.

5-4 The market section in the Market Definition, Designation and Dominance (MDDD) Report may identify and prioritize key markets that play a pivotal role in the broader national developmental objectives and have a strategic importance to the Kingdom.

5-5 CST may, at the time of analyzing a specific Telecommunications Market or markets that may be subject to ex-ante regulation, take the following into consideration:

5-5-1 Alternatives on the demand side, in order to determine the availability of alternative telecommunications services to the telecommunications services under consideration that telecommunications services users can use.

5-5-2 Alternatives on the supply side, in order to determine the availability of alternative telecommunications services to the telecommunications services under consideration that telecommunications services providers can offer.

5-6 Any aiding alternatives CST considers as factors affecting designating the market, including the evaluation of the smallest group of services and the smallest geographic area, within the limits of which the service provider can maintain an increase in prices for a non-temporary period. In most cases, an increase of five per cent (5%) is deemed a notable increase in prices, and a period of one year or less is deemed a temporary period.

DESIGNATING AND CLASSIFYING RELEVANT MARKETS IN THE REPORT

6. DESIGNATING AND CLASSIFYING RELEVANT MARKETS IN THE REPORT

6-1 There may be single dominance or joint dominance in a market. CST will apply the standards and tests described in the Market Analysis of Dominance Criteria set out in Appendix 1 hereof when classifying a telecommunications service provider as a Dominant Service Provider in a specific Telecommunications Market or markets in the Market Definition, Designation and Dominance (MDDD) Report.

6-2 CST may carry out reviews of the market to ensure that ex-ante regulation remains appropriate and proportionate in the light of changing market conditions. CST may, in its discretion and at any time, classify and designate a market or a Dominant Service Provider, and issue relevant ex-ante regulation, by way of a CST decision if urgent correction of market trends is required without the need to update the Market Definition, Designation and Dominance (MDDD) Report.

6-3 CST shall assess the market position and conduct of the service provider, including its affiliated entities, to evaluate the following, but not limited to

6-3-1 The Dominant Service Provider shall not use another entity of its group to carry out activities that would otherwise classify the provider as dominant.

6-3-2 Multiple service providers can hold a dominant position if they have structural or other connections, such as affiliated entities or joint ventures, or if they coordinate their actions in a manner that creates joint dominance.

6-3-3 Markets where another Affiliated Entity of the group is providing services can be analyzed to ensure that they are carrying out activities and complying with conditions which would typically be the responsibility of the Dominant Service Provider.

6-4 CST will prepare a comprehensive study to determine the extent to which Significant Market Power or a Dominant Service Provider exists in a specific Telecommunications Market or markets pursuant to Article (Error! Reference source not found.) hereof. CST may take into consideration, upon determining the market or markets that may be subject to ex-ante regulation, the following standards:

6-4-1 Whether the Telecommunications Market under consideration is subject to high and permanent entry barriers.

6-4-2 Whether the Telecommunications Market under consideration is naturally moving over the short or medium term, and is competitive enough to protect the users’ interests, without regulatory intervention.

6-4-3 Whether applying the regulation for handling dominance practices after they occur (Ex-post) in the Telecommunications Market is sufficient to not apply ex-ante regulation to limit dominance practices before they occur in order to reduce the effects expected to appear as a result of dominance.

DESIGNATING AND CLASSIFYING RELEVANT MARKETS IN THE REPORT

7. DESIGNATING AND CLASSIFYING RELEVANT MARKETS IN THE REPORT

7-1 If CST classifies one or more service providers as a Dominant Service Provider in one or more wholesale Telecommunications Markets, CST may take into consideration the sufficiency of applying ex-ante regulation in the wholesale Telecommunications Market to reduce the expected implications of dominating related retail markets.

7-2 CST may, in addition to the ex-ante regulation stated in the Bylaw, require the Dominant Service Provider and/or its affiliated entities in a specific Telecommunications Market or markets to fulfill one or more of the following requirements:

7-2-1 Obtain CST’s approval for the prices of services prior to their enforcement, as well as informing all of its customers of them.

7-2-2 Publishing the reference offer for wholesale services.

7-2-3 Providing the ability to access physical facilities, if technically possible, with fair and reasonable terms and conditions and appropriate prices.

7-2-4 Providing separate accounts for costs and revenue related to its services.

7-2-5 Establishing a cost-based pricing approach for the provision of retail and wholesale services, ensuring the price covers all costs associated with the provision of the product or service, and a profit margin deemed reasonable by CST

7-2-6 Establishing a reciprocity-based pricing approach with another Service Provider

7-2-7 Any other ex-ante regulation CST deems appropriate to apply.

7-3 CST shall provide detailed information about the ex-ante regulation within the Market Definition, Designation and Dominance (MDDD) Report in order to allow the relevant service providers to fully understand the ex-ante regulation, including, without limitation, their specific provisions, how to comply with them, the pricing and non-pricing remedies, and their relevant market and duration.

7-4 CST may impose additional highly specialized ex-ante regulation for a specific service provider or a specific market to optimize the outcomes of the ex-ante regulation to limit dominance practices before they occur. This may include, without limitation, tailored solutions for network access, prevention of discrimination, creating specific reference offers, publication of the reference offers, implementing pricing and non-pricing ex-ante regulation, requiring quality of service information, requiring financial reporting, or requiring pricing transparency exclusively for certain products.

7-5 In case the ex-ante regulation is not sufficient to avoid possible damage arising from dominance or Significant Market Power, CST has the right to ask the Dominant Service Provider and/or its affiliated entities to implement effective structural separation between business units (for example, separating parts related to infrastructure, which is deemed one of the parts that cannot be economically repeated with effectiveness, into a separate business unit). The Dominant Service Provider and/or its affiliated entities shall operate such unit independently of its business units for retail and other business units, in order to ensure equality between all these units and other similar units of other telecommunications services providers, with the aim of ensuring their equal access to information and services.

SERVICE PROVIDERS CONSULTATION AND INVOLVEMENT

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1: MARKET ANALYSIS OF DOMINANCE CRITERIA

1. Overview

1-1 Upon classifying a telecommunications service provider as a Dominant Service Provider, CST will apply the standards and tests described in Article (Fifteen) of the Act and Article (Fifty-one) of the Bylaw,as well as one or more of the other criteria or standards of the market based on CST’s judgement described below.

2. Criteria for Single Dominance

2-1 Without limiting its ability to consider other factors and criteria to determine whether single dominance exists in a market, CST will have regard to the application of the following non-exhaustive criteria:

2-1-1 Significant market power: whether the service provider, unilaterally, or through agreement with other service providers, has the ability to exercise Significant Market Power in any market in which it provides services pursuant to its license.

2-1-2 Volume level of market shares: whether the service provider, as indicated by revenue or the number of subscribers or other relevant statistics has a significant market share.

2-1-3 Market share evolution: whether the service provider has significantly improved its market share of telecommunications services over time.

2-1-4 Price changes: the level of change in the prices of telecommunications services of the service provider during the last MDDD period.

2-1-5 Unusual earnings: the ability of the telecommunications service provider to achieve unusual earnings.

2-1-6 Easy or privileged access to capital markets/financial resources: financial resources of the telecommunications service provider and the ability to obtain funding that enables the service provider to finance its investments, expansion, or innovation, or to engage in predatory or exclusionary practices, without facing significant constraints or risks.

2-1-7 The technological advantages and superiority: the ability of the telecommunications service provider to benefit from technologies that competitors cannot benefit from.

2-1-8 Preferential contracts: the ability of the telecommunications service provider to obtain contracts with preferential nature or that are long-term to provide relevant services to key users.

2-1-9 The overall size of the service provider: in terms of its market share, revenues, assets, or other measures of economic strength, relative to its competitors and the overall market.

2-1-10 The control of infrastructure not easily duplicated: such as essential facilities, networks, platforms, or technologies, that give the service provider a competitive advantage or create barriers to entry or expansion for other service providers.

2-1-11 The network effects: the positive feedback effects that arise when the value or utility of a product or service increases with the number or size of its users or customers, and that may create or reinforce market power or lock-in effects.

2-1-12 The absence of or low countervailing buying power: the ability of customers or consumers to exert pressure on the service provider by switching to alternative suppliers, negotiating better terms and conditions, or sponsoring the entry or expansion of other service providers.

2-1-13 The economies of scale: the cost advantages that enable the service provider to achieve and retain a position of advantage and possibly of dominance in a market.

2-1-14 The economies of scope: when the range of businesses and operations of an enterprise allow it to spread its fixed common and overhead costs across the full range of its services.

2-1-15 Vertical integration: measured based on the control or influence of the service provider over different stages of the production or distribution chain that may give it a competitive advantage or create barriers to entry or expansion for other service providers, or affect the access to inputs, customers, or markets.

2-1-16 Highly developed distribution and sales network: may give the service provider a competitive advantage or create barriers to entry or expansion for other service providers, or affect the access to customers or markets.

2-1-17 Absence of potential competition: measured by the lack of credible or effective threats of entry or expansion by new or existing service providers.

2-1-18 Barriers to expansion: assessed by the obstacles or difficulties faced by the service provider’s competitors to increase their output, capacity, or market share.

2-1-19 Ease of market entry: evaluated based on the feasibility and cost of entering the relevant market by new service providers.

2-1-20 Excess pricing and profitability: measured by the profitability of the service provider in the relevant market compared to the profitability that might be expected in the market if it was competitive.

2-1-21 Lack of active competition on non-price factors: such as quality, variety, innovation, or service, that may indicate the existence or exercise of market power or the lack of effective pressure from customers or consumers.

2-1-22 Switching barriers: measured by the costs or difficulties faced by customers or consumers to change their supplier or product, either in terms of monetary, technical orcontractualfactors.

2-1-23 Customers’ ability to access and use information: the availability and quality of the information on the products, services, prices, or terms and conditions offered by the service provider and its competitors that impacts the ability of the consumer to compare other services with the one they have.

3. Criteria for Joint Dominance

3-1 Dominant position may be held collectively (joint dominance) when two or more legally independent service providers are linked in such a way that they adopt a common policy in relation to the market.

3-2 There are three necessary conditions to designate joint dominance:

3-2-1 the market must be sufficiently transparent for each member of the oligopoly to monitor the behavior of other members;

3-2-2 there must be a clear incentive for individual members of the oligopoly not to cheat by departing from any common policy on the market (therefore, there should be adequate deterrents to ensure long-term compliance); and

3-2-3 it must be established that the reactions of any actual or future competitors, customers or consumers will not be able to jeopardize the results expected from the common policy.

3-3 Without limiting its ability to consider other factors and criteria to determine whether joint dominance exists in a market, CST will consider the application of some or all of the following criteria:

3-3-1 Market concentration: the degree to which the market is dominated by a few service providers, which may facilitate collusion or parallelism.

3-3-2 Transparency: the extent to which the service providers have visibility on each other’s prices and quantities, which may reduce uncertainty and increase stability.

3-3-3 Mature market: the stage of development of the market, which may limit the scope for innovation, differentiation, and entry.

3-3-4 Stagnant or moderate growth on the demand side: the level of sales activity over time, expressed in volume (rather than price) terms. These are essentially measures of market inertia.

3-3-5 Low elasticity of demand: the responsiveness of the demand to changes in price.

3-3-6 Homogenous product: the degree of substitutability and differentiation of the products or services offered by the service providers, which may affect the intensity and nature of competition or collusion.

3-3-7 Similar cost structure: the degree of similarity or asymmetry of the service providers’ costs, which may affect their margins, incentives, and ability to collude or deviate from a collusive agreement or tacit understanding.

3-3-8 Similar market share: the degree of equality or disparity of the service providers’ market shares, which may affect their relative bargaining power, influence, and stability in the market.

3-3-9 Lack of technical innovation, mature technology: the level of innovation and technological change in the market, which may affect the potential for product differentiation, cost reduction, and entry.

3-3-10 Absence of excess capacity: measured by an audit of excess capacity or enquiry of market participants about network utilization.

3-3-11 High barriers to entry: the obstacles or costs that prevent or discourage new entrants or potential competitors from entering or expanding in the market.

3-3-12 Lack of countervailing buying power: the ability of customers or consumers to exert pressure on the service provider by switching to alternative suppliers, negotiating better terms and conditions, or sponsoring the entry or expansion of other service providers.

3-3-13 Lack of potential competition: measured by the lack of credible or effective threats of entry or expansion by new or existing service providers.

3-3-14 Various kinds of informal and other links between the service providers concerned: the existence and nature of any legal, economic, or personal ties or relationships between the service providers, which may facilitate communication, coordination, or alignment of their behavior in the market.

3-3-15 Retaliatory mechanisms: the level of inter-firm wholesale activity is a measure of the opportunity for one competitor to be potentially harmful to another. A second measure is whether the conditions for a price war – progressive retaliation to price initiatives with yet lower prices – exist in a market.

3-3-16 Lack of or reduced scope for price competition: the degree of price competition or non-price competition in the market, which may affect the service providers’ incentives and ability to collude or compete on other dimensions, such as quality, service, or innovation.

3-3-17 Existence of incentives for tacit collusion: the presence and strength of any factors or conditions that may induce or encourage the service providers to align their behavior in the market, without the need for explicit communication or agreement, such as repeated interaction, focal points, or price leadership.

3-3-18 Ability to enforce the terms of a collusive agreement or tacit understanding: the existence and feasibility of any mechanisms or arrangements that the service providers can use to monitor, verify, or enforce compliance with a collusive agreement or tacit understanding.

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 3

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Executive Summary

Executive Summary

1-1 Introduction

To comply with the obligations outlined in the Telecommunications and Information Technology Act, the Telecommunications and Information Technology Bylaw, as well as, the Designation of Markets and Dominance in Telecommunications Sector Regulation, the Communications, Space and Technology Commission (CST) has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the competitive dynamics within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's telecommunications sector. This analysis, known as the Market Definition, Designation, and Dominance (MDDD) process, aims to identify any Dominant Service Providers and determine the necessity and methods for addressing such dominance with ex ante remedies.

1-2 Definition of markets and susceptibility to ex ante regulation

CST initiated its MDDD process review by conducting a comprehensive analysis of the telecommunications sector in the KSA. This involved thoroughly examining the services available for both retail and wholesale customers.

The next stage was to determine whether these services belong or not to the same market and to establish the geographic boundaries of the market. The primary approach used for this determination was examining potential demand and supply-side substitution through a SSNIP (Small but significant non-transitory increase in price) test. CST examined the impact of grouping certain services together and found that it had no effect on other stages of the MDDD process. This approach not only simplifies regulatory complexities but also helps mitigate potential constraints. Regarding the geographical scope, a national analysis will be conducted when market conditions are consistent throughout the country. Conversely, a regional analysis will be conducted when there are potential variations.

The final stage was to use the Three Criteria Test to evaluate these markets for their susceptibility to ex ante regulation. This test comprised the following criteria: determining if the market exhibits high and non-transitory barriers to entry; assessing whether the market would naturally tend to have sufficient competition and evaluating if relying solely on ex post remedies would be insufficient to address anti-competitive behavior. The analysis yielded the following results:

Market susceptible to ex ante regulation	Summary of services included[1]
Retail Fixed Access and Fixed Calls	Provision of access over copper, fiber, and fixed wireless networks. Switched voice calls, managed Voice over IP (VoIP) calls, and calls to both domestic and international destinations. Other services offered to residential and non-residential customers.
Retail Fixed Broadband Services	Broadband services delivered via xDSL, fixed wireless access, and fiber technologies, available to residential and non-residential customers.
Retail FTTx Broadband Services	This sub-market encompasses broadband services delivered through Fiber to the Home (FTTH) for residential customers and Fiber to the Business (FTTB) for non-residential customers. Additionally, other modalities such as Fiber to the Room (FTTR) are also included.
Retail Leased Lines	Dedicated, fixed-bandwidth data connection provided by a Service Provider that deliver both fixed connectivity and internet circuits to the businesses and organizations. It offers a private, consistent link for accessing the internet and/or connecting two or multiple locations, ensuring high reliability, symmetrical speeds and guaranteed service level agreement.
Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure	Local fixed access products provided over all the technologies Physical infrastructures like ducts, colocation facilities, dark fiber, and additional facilities. Services such as manholes, cable landing points, towers, masts, buildings, sites, along with power and air conditioning provisions.
Wholesale Broadband Access	Includes Wholesale Bitstream Access for Fiber and xDSL and the Access to physical infrastructure.
Wholesale Transit Services	Self-provision of transit services and transit of national and international traffic Transit of traffic up to and including the level of international gateways within the KSA's borders.
Wholesale Fixed Call Termination	Termination of calls originating from all fixed and mobile operators.
Wholesale Access to Terminating Segments of Leased Lines	This encompasses two main components. Firstly, it includes the wholesale national terminating segments of leased lines service, as well as the terminating segments of L2VPN and L3VPN. Secondly, it incorporates the Dedicated Internet Access (DIA) service, along with wholesale leased line services, including wholesale national leased line services and CNFO.
Wholesale Access to Trunk Segments of Leased Lines	Trunk segments for all bandwidths for leased lines, including both wired and wireless.
Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination	Wholesale national roaming, Coverage-as-a-service and self-supply by MNOs.
Wholesale Mobile Termination	Termination of services for mobile number allocation and all services from another licensed SP, regardless of the point of origination.
Wholesale MVNO Host Services	Encompasses the services that allow an MVNO licensee, without spectrum assignment or a radio access network, to lease mobile network capacity from MNOs.

Exhibit 1.2: Overview of the markets susceptible to ex ante regulation

1-3 Dominance designation

Listed below are the Service Providers determined to hold dominant positions in each of the markets described above.

Relevant Markets	Dominant Service Providers
M1: Retail Fixed Access and Fixed Calls	STC
M2: Retail Fixed Broadband Services	STC
M2.1: Retail FTTx Broadband Services	STC
M3: Retail Leased Lines	STC
M5: Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure	At the national level: STC, Tawal, Center3 & Integrated Dawiyat CST has the authority to designate a Service Provider as dominant in a region if it meets the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.3
M6: Wholesale Broadband Access	At the national level STC & Integrated Dawiyat CST has the authority to designate a Service Provider as dominant in a region if it meets the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.3
M7: Wholesale Transit Services	STC, Center3
M8: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination	STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go
M9: Wholesale Access to Terminating Segments of Leased Lines	STC
M10: Wholesale Access to Trunk Segments of Leased Lines	STC
M11: Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination	STC
M12: Wholesale Mobile Termination	STC, Mobily, Zain
M13: Wholesale MVNO Host Services	STC, Mobily, Zain

Exhibit 1.3: Overview of dominance assessments across retail and wholesale markets

1-4 Remedies
The table below outlines the ex ante remedies, if applicable, for each relevant market:

Relevant Markets	Ex ante remedies
M1: Retail Fixed Access and Fixed Calls	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M2: Retail Fixed Broadband Services	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M2.1: Retail FTTx Broadband Services	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M3: Retail Leased Lines	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M5: Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure	Provision of access services to the physical infrastructure Non-discrimination Transmission of any DSP agreements on physical local fixed access services to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only) Unbundling of services Amendments to existing services
M6: Wholesale Broadband Access	Provision of wholesale fixed broadband access services Non-discrimination Transmission of any DSP agreements on wholesale fixed broadband access services to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only) Unbundling of services Amendments to existing services
M7: Wholesale Transit Services	Provision of wholesale transit services Non-discrimination Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation
M8: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination	Provision of wholesale fixed call termination services Non-discrimination Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST Cost orientation of termination fees Publication of a reference offer (STC only) Accounting separation (STC only) Prohibition to charge higher fees than those of STC (other SPs)
M9: Wholesale Access to Terminating Segments of Leased Lines	Provision of wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines Non-discrimination Publication of a reference offer Cost orientation of fees Accounting separation
M10: Wholesale Access to Trunk Segments of Leased Lines	Provision of wholesale services for access to trunk segments of leased lines Non-discrimination Publication of a reference offer Cost orientation of fees Accounting separation
M11: Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination	Provision of wholesale mobile access and call origination Non-discrimination Transmission of agreements to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation
M12: Wholesale Mobile Termination	Provision of wholesale mobile termination services Non-discrimination Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST Cost orientation of termination fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only)
M13: Wholesale MVNO Host Services	Provision of wholesale MVNO host services Non-discrimination Transmission of agreements to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only)

Exhibit 1.4: Overview of ex ante remedies across all relevant retail and wholesale markets

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[1] See Appendix 7.2 for a full description of the services included within the market.

Introduction

2. Introduction

The Telecommunications and Information Technology Act[1] (2022) and the Telecommunications and Information Technology Bylaw[2] (2022) require the Communications, Space and Technology Commission (CST) to conduct an analysis of the competitive landscape in the telecommunications sector in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This analysis aims to define markets susceptible to ex ante regulation, determine if any Service Providers holds a dominant position in the market and establish measures to mitigate this dominance through ex ante remedies. This process is known as the “Market Definition, Designation, and Dominance (MDDD)", and its methodology is outlined in the Regulation for Designation of Markets and Dominance (2024).

In conducting this MDDD assessment, CST has engaged in preliminary conversations with stakeholders in the Kingdom, collected data from Service Providers, and gained insights from international experts into effective ex ante regulation practices outside the Kingdom. Additionally, CST has examined global standards and methodologies for MDDD assessments, as well as the design and potential impact of ex ante remedies on the market.

2-1 Structure of this report

The remainder of this report is organized as follows:
·        Section 2.2: An explanation of CST's proposed approach in preparing this MDDD report;
·        Section 3: The approach to define the retail and wholesale markets;
·        Section 4: Three Criteria Test for the defined retail and wholesale markets;
·        Section 5: Competition assessment of the retail and wholesale markets;
·        Section 6: Remedies for the retail and wholesale markets; and
·        Section 7: Appendix encompassing market and remedies definition.

2-2 Overall report approach to the MDDD

The methodology utilized in the MDDD Report encompasses four key steps in the process:

1 Market definition: This involves the definition of appropriate grouping of telecom services in a determined geographical area.

2 Susceptibility to ex ante remedies: The "three criteria test" is employed to determine if the defined markets are susceptible to ex ante regulation.

3 Competition assessment: This includes conducting a competition assessment to identify whether one or more Service Providers, followed by an analysis of competition issues that arise from such dominance.

4 Remedies determination: The final step involves determining suitable ex ante remedies to address the identified competition problems.

2-2-1 Market definition approach

This process starts with a thorough evaluation of services that are available in the Kingdom for retail customers and SPs. The methodology will progress to classify together those services, that are used for analogous purposes. Then the assessment uses demand-side and supply-side substitution analysis, as explained in Article 5-5 in the Designation of Markets and Dominance in Telecommunications Sector Regulation, to gauge the degree to which these products are interchangeable. A SSNIP tes will be used as a method for analyzing substitution possibilities on both the demand and supply sides.

The geographical boundaries for the market will be determined by regions where competitive conditions are sufficiently uniform and distinct from adjacent areas and are expected to remain stable over the next time review period. The scope of the geographic market scope is often influenced by factors such as the network's coverage area, consistency of pricing and quality of service, and/or defined by regulatory authorities, though not limited to geographic boundaries of a license. CST will consider these factors, when evaluating the geographical scope.

2-2-2 Susceptibility to ex ante remedies definition approach (3CT)

The 'three criteria test' (3CT) is then used to each identified market to determine the need for ex ante regulation. This evaluation involves assessing the markets for specific criteria, including (i) high and non-transitory entry barriers, (ii) the absence of effective competition, and (iii) the inadequacy of relying solely on ex post intervention

For a market to be considered for ex ante regulation, it must meet all three criteria collectively. If any single criterion is not met, the market is deemed unsuitable for ex ante regulatory measures and is better suited for ex post regulation.

Passing the 3CT for a market does not imply the existence of a dominant Service Provider in the market. The competition assessment will be conducted separately for those markets identified as susceptible to ex ante regulation.

2-2-3 Competition assessment approach

The Telecommunications and Information Technology Act, along with its Bylaw, and the Regulations for Designation of Markets and Dominance, establish specific criteria that CST must adhere to when conducting the competition assessment. Notably, Article 15 of the Telecommunications Act states that (i) the Service Provider shall be deemed controlling if its service covers at least (40%) of the relevant telecommunications or information technology market or part thereof; (ii) CST has the authority to adjust this proportion based on market conditions and implement necessary measures to identify the controlling Service Provider.

To complete the multi-factor assessment on dominance, the Bylaw and Regulations provide an additional 32 criteria for designating a Service Provider as a Dominant Service Provider, which can be found in Appendix 7.4.

Additionally, for some markets joint dominance may be assessed. When evaluating joint dominance, a comprehensive three-step test is employed to ensure a thorough analysis of the market dynamics. The three-step test consists of the following evaluation:
· The market must be transparent for each member to monitor others' behavior.

· There must be a clear incentive for SPs to adhere to a common policy, with deterrents to ensure long-term compliance.

· It must be established that competitors, customers, or consumers cannot undermine the expected results of the common policy.

Once the assessment of all the relevant criteria from the market is complete, the next crucial step involves evaluating the competitive landscape. This will be dome by grouping the result of the market into two categories, (i) the competition situation and (ii) the competition potential for the market.

When evaluating the existing competition within a market, CST considers a range of factors. These factors include the number of active Service Providers operating in the market, concentration ratios such as HHI[3] or CR2[4] In the context of retail markets: excessive charging, anti-competitive pricing (such as predatory pricing), undisclosed fees or cross-subsidies, and the distribution of market shares among these Service Providers. However, relying solely on concentration ratios may not provide a comprehensive understanding of the competitive landscape, especially considering the potential entry barriers of new Service Providers into the market.

The assessment of potential competition in the market involves considering a broader set of indicators. These indicators encompass various factors, such as barriers to entry or expansion, ease of entry into the market, control of essential facilities, economies of scale, scope and density, sales network, total revenues of the Service Provider, vertical integration, and technological advancements, among others. By examining these indicators, CST can gain a better understanding of the competitive dynamics within the market, enabling it to make informed decisions regarding the existence of dominance.

Note that if multiple Service Providers control essential facilities in the market, CST reserves the right to designate them as dominant within their respective networks at the geographical level deemed appropriate by CST, as stipulated by Article 51 of the Bylaw.

2-2-4 Risks mitigated by ex ante regulation

Ex ante regulation serves as a preventive measure and does not deal with actual violations committed by Service Providers, which should be addressed through ex post regulation. Its purpose is to anticipate and address situations where the Dominant Service Provider may engage in practices that could harm other competing Service Providers. The Regulation outlines a range of typical instances where competition or consumer welfare may be compromised due to market dominance in the telecommunications industry. It is important to note that the list provided is not exhaustive, as advancements in technology and business practices may lead to the emergence of new forms of anti-competitive behavior.

In the context of retail markets: excessive charging, anti-competitive pricing (such as predatory pricing), undisclosed fees or cross-subsidies; unfair terms and conditions, information asymmetry, or subscriber lock-in; decrease in quality; limited availability of innovative products.

For wholesale markets: unfair terms and conditions, information asymmetry, subscriber lock-in, and similar issues; decrease in quality; limited availability of innovative products; overcharging, anti-competitive pricing, cross-subsidies, and similar practices; denial or delay in providing services, and so on; general discrimination in favor of the Service Provider's own retail operations.

CST acknowledges the importance of implementing ex ante regulation to prevent Dominant Service Providers from engaging in certain practices that could impact competing Services Providers.

2-2-5 Remedies approach

The imposition of ex-ante remedies is the last step in the market review process, aimed at addressing competition concerns resulting from dominance findings. These remedies should meet the following criteria: they should be proportionate, minimizing the costs associated with regulation; they should be appropriate, effectively addressing the identified problem; and they should be non-discriminatory, following a transparent process that does not unfairly restrict any specific provider compared to others in a similar position.

CST is required to consider factors such as the specific market involved, the level of dominance within that market, the potential harm to competition or consumers due to such dominance, and the effectiveness and efficiency of market outcomes and ex post intervention in mitigating these threats.

The Telecommunications and Information Technology Bylaw allows the imposition of various ex ante remedies on DSPs relating to interconnection, access and tariff control. Full detail can be seen in Appendix 7.5. These obligations complement other regulatory obligations applicable to all Service Providers. Specific duties for DSPs are further detailed in the CST's Interconnection Regulations and its Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

In addition, the Regulations for Designation of Markets & Dominance in the Telecom Sector empowers CST to impose certain supplementary remedies on a Service Provider that has been designated as dominant in one or more telecommunications markets. The full list of supplementary remedies can be found in Appendix 7.6.

CST reserves the discretion to mandate a DSP's compliance with any other remedies that CST may consider appropriate. Additionally, CST will enforce necessary regulatory actions among business units, in alignment with the guiding principles outlined in the Regulation.

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[2] Telecommunications and Information Technology Act, issued under the Ministers Resolution No. (592), dated 01/11/1443 AH (corresponding to 31/05/2022G) and approved pursuant to the Royal Decree No. (M/106), dated 02/11/1443 AH (corresponding to 01/06/2022G).

[3] Telecommunications and Information Technology Bylaw, issued by the Minister of Communications and Information Technology's Resolution No. (13) dated 14/05/1444 AH (corresponding to 08/12/2022).

[4] The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration that is commonly used to assess the distribution of market power. Commonly, HHI = SUM [(Market share of each firm)2] and the index can range from close to 0 (greater competition) to 10,000 (in a perfect monopoly).

[5] The concentration ratio (CR) measures the market share of the largest firms in a market. In the case of CR2, it specifically measures the market share of the two largest firms. Commonly, CR2 = SUM (Market share of 2 largest firms).

Market Definition

3. Market Definition

3-1 Definition of Retail markets

3-1-1 Introduction

After conducting a thorough analysis of the services available to retail customers in the KSA, they will be categorized based on how retail customers can purchase them in the KSA. It is important to note that access and connection to the network are bundled together, as they cannot be bought separately. The following are the different groups:

• Services related to fixed line calls.

• Services for broadband connectivity

• Services for mobile services

• Services for high-capacity connectivity, specifically for organizations (e.g., large businesses and government agencies)

3-1-2 Services related to fixed line calls

Services for fixed-line calls encompass the provision of connectivity, access, and capabilities that facilitate effective communication for both residential and non-residential customers. Once customers gain access through either fixed or wireless infrastructure , they are able to engage in fixed voice calls. Typically, customers purchase access networks and call services together across all the mentioned technologies. However, customers also have the option to choose bundled services that include other products, such as broadband services, OTTs, set up boxes and devices. It is important to note that not all retail broadband products are necessarily tied to these bundles. Therefore, the market definition for fixed calls and access services essentially revolves around a retail product market that encompasses both access and call services.

Following this, market boundaries will be established to evaluate whether all services and products are part of the same market. This evaluation will consider both demand side and supply side substitution.

3-1-2-1 Are fixed and wireless infrastructure technologies included in the provision of retail fixed access and calls?

CST determines that retail fixed access and calls provided through fixed and wireless infrastructure belong to the same product market due to demand side substitution . The details are as follows:
3-1-2-1-1 Demand side substitution

Both fixed infrastructure and wireless infrastructure offer access for telephony and broadband services, with comparable quality for voice calls and additional retail services. However, FTTx is the technology that has gained more subscriptions in the last three years, indicating a customer preference for fiber where available. CST believes that customers are likely to switch from their current technology to FTTx, suggesting a one-way demand substitution to FTTx.

CST notes that FWA could be a substitute for other technologies such as FTTx. Running a SSNIP test, CST finds that customers from other technologies will be able to switch to FWA, although there will be some limitations when compared to other technologies, such as lower upload and download speeds, higher latency, limitations in range and coverage, among others.

Price comparisons across different technologies reveal complexity due to varied service bundling by operators. For instance, fiber and wireless technologies could offer bundles that include broadband. In assessing price sensitivity, CST found that customers using copper networks could switch to fiber for a similar or lower cost. Therefore, CST concludes that fixed infrastructure and wireless infrastructure could be grouped within the same product market for retail access and calls.

3-1-2-1-2 Supply side substitution

A SSNIP test shows that supply side substitution, which involves Service Providers of access networks switching from one technology to another in response to a SSNIP, is not feasible due to the high costs associated with developing an access network.

3-1-2-2 Are VoIP calls included within the scope of the retail fixed access and calls market?

In assessing the scope of the retail fixed access and calls market, CST considered whether VoIP calls conducted over broadband connections could be a substitute for traditional switched calls made over the legacy copper network. VoIP calls are categorized as Managed VoIP, where Service Providers offer call services along with an IP access path, and Unmanaged or OTT VoIP services, which rely on customers accessing them through the public internet or applications. CST examined the capabilities of customers to initiate and receive calls to and from any location and any type of number when purchasing a retail access and call service.

CST concludes that managed VoIP, due to its functional similarities and usage patterns, should be considered part of the retail fixed access and calls product market. However, calls made via unmanaged VoIP have distinct functionalities that suggest they do not belong to this market. Despite this distinction, CST acknowledges the significant use of OTT unmanaged VoIP services and includes their competitive impact in assessing the retail fixed access and calls market. Details of the assessments are as follows.

3-1-2-2-1 Demand side substitution

Managed VoIP services offer similar functionalities as traditional switched calls. These services allow users to make and receive calls with geographic numbers at fixed locations, often using devices that resemble traditional telephones. This similarity in functionality suggests that users could switch to Managed VoIP if prices for traditional switched calls were to increase significantly. A key factor in considering Managed VoIP as a substitute is the requirement for a broadband connection. It may restrict some users from switching if they do not have broadband access, but the increased number of broadband subscribers reduces this barrier. A SSNIP test reveals that customers of traditional switched calls would evaluate the feasibility and costs of switching to alternatives like Managed VoIP. The decision would largely depend on the availability and affordability of broadband, as well as the comparative total cost of obtaining Managed VoIP services.

Although Unmanaged VoIP offers considerable cost advantages and flexibility, the inferior service quality and higher dependency on user-managed settings make Unmanaged VoIP a less likely substitute in response to a SSNIP on traditional switched calls.

3-1-2-2-2 Supply side substitution

The possibility of a new entrant offering traditional switched voice calls in reaction to a SSNIP in fixed calls is low. It is anticipated that managed VoIP call services will gradually replace traditional circuit-switched calls, especially as copper networks are phased out in favor of the technologically superior fiber infrastructure.

Suppliers of Unmanaged VoIP services are unlikely to transition to offering traditional switched telephony. In order to provide the same functionality as switched calls, such a provider would need to obtain access to geographic numbers and set up their own routing and customer connection paths, which would require a substantial investment. This shift is not considered a feasible short-term strategy in response to a SSNIP test in traditional voice call pricing

3-1-2-3 Does the market encompass calls to all destinations without distinction?

The scope of call destinations includes both national and international calls. From the perspective of national calls within the KSA, all numbers are treated equally, and all fixed Service Providers are required to set uniform charges for fixed telephony services across the country.

However, customers do not see national and international calls as interchangeable. This is because these calls fulfill different customer needs. Nonetheless, it is typical for customers to expect the capability to connect to any destination from their fixed lines.

CST holds the perspective that calls to any destination, whether domestic or international, fall within the same retail fixed access and calls market. Further details are described below.

3-1-2-3-1 Demand side substitution

On the demand side, customers face different pricing structures for domestic versus international calls. This difference largely reflects the additional transit and termination costs associated with international calls. Due to these inherent differences in customer needs and the associated costs, applying a SSNIP test is insufficient for determining demand side substitution between domestic and international calls. CST anticipates that OTT services will have a more pronounced competitive impact on international calls than on domestic ones.

3-1-2-3-2 Supply side substitution

Currently Service Providers offer both national and international calls. Since Service Providers already include these capabilities, applying a SSNIP test on supply side will not support further evidence.

Furthermore, Service Providers proactively adapt to market demands by offering international bundles targeted at more frequently called destinations. They could easily adjust their supply under a SSNIP test to introduce bundled prices for countries with higher demand, enhancing competitiveness and market alignment.

3-1-2-4 Does the market for retail fixed access and calls encompass services provided to both business and residential customers?

CST concludes that the market for retail fixed access and calls does indeed encompass services provided to both residential and non-residential customers. They fall within the same market due to the functional similarities and the comprehensive nature of service offerings.

3-1-2-4-1 Demand side substitution

The services of retail fixed access and calls, whether delivered over fixed infrastructure or wireless infrastructure exhibit uniform characteristics across both residential and business customers. This consistency is reflected in the lack of significant differences in pricing and marketing strategies for these customer groups. Given this uniformity, applying a SSNIP test does not provide additional useful insights, as both customer types are presented with similar service options and face comparable pricing structures

3-1-2-4-2 Supply side substitution

From the supply perspective, providers servicing residential customers can effortlessly extend their offerings to business clients, due to the similar requirements and capabilities of the services involved. In practical terms, operators routinely serve both segments without distinction. The adaptability of network technologies has facilitated suppliers in scaling their services efficiently to meet the demands of both market segments without requiring significant modifications. Thus, a SSNIP test will not give further insights in this scenario, as it would not reveal any significant shifts in competitive dynamics or market perceptions, given that providers are already equipped to address the needs of both types of customers.

3-1-2-5 Geographic market

Retail fixed access and calls are uniformly available across the Kingdom, and pricing remains consistent nationwide, with Service Providers licensed to operate across the entire country. Regarding fiber access, Fiber Optic Delivery Regulations enhance network fiber deployment. While CST notes that Service Providers are expanding fiber networks, Open Access measures will stimulate retail-level competition by promoting alternative networks across the Kingdom.

3-1-2-6 Summary of findings for services related to fixed line calls

The market for retail fixed access and calls encompasses access through various fixed infrastructures, including fixed and wireless infrastructure for fixed connectivity. It supports various types of calls, such as traditional switched voice calls and managed VoIP calls. This market caters to a wide customer base by providing services that enable calls to any destination, both domestic and international, and serves both residential and business customers. This reflects its broad and inclusive service provision. The market is considered to be national in scope.

3-1-3 Services for broadband connectivity

The range of services for broadband connectivity includes various fixed options such as fiber-based retail broadband services and other wireless options such as Fixed Wireless Access (FWA), WiMax, among others. It also encompasses broadband services tailored specifically for both residential and non-residential customers. Additionally, services are available from Internet Service Providers (ISPs).

The discussed technologies offer customers the capability to access data services, particularly internet connectivity. These services are available either directly from the provider that facilitates access or through another Service Provider. Therefore, the market definition for fixed broadband services essentially revolves around a retail product market that encompasses both access and data services.

3-1-3-1 Are fixed technologies and wireless part of the same market?

CST concludes that retail fixed broadband services provided over fixed and wireless infrastructure are in the same product market, because customers can easily switch among these technologies and Service Providers have potential to adapt their infrastructure to offer different services. Further details are described below.

3-1-3-1-1 Demand side substitution

From the demand perspective, customers purchasing broadband services can easily switch between xDSL, fiber, and FWA technologies. This interchangeability is based on the fundamental features these technologies provide, such as reliable and always-on connectivity, as well as comparable speeds where applicable. If a monopolist in the fiber market were to raise prices by SSNIP test, it is likely that a significant number of consumers would switch to xDSL, FWA services or other technologies, assuming these alternatives are available and competitively priced. This potential for customer migration indicates that these broadband technologies are substitutable and belong to the same product market from the demand side.

3-1-3-1-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, the substitution between fixed and wireless technologies is influenced by the required infrastructure and investment. Providers currently offering FWA may encounter significant capital investment and technological adjustments to transition to fiber or other solutions, as these technologies have distinct underlying network requirements. However, if a provider can leverage existing infrastructure to adapt, it could mitigate some substitution barriers and successfully pass a SSNIP test. The asymmetry in substitution is also apparent, as providers of fiber broadband, with superior technology and higher speeds, are less inclined to view xDSL as a viable substitute. This suggests that while there is potential for supply-side substitution, it is constrained by the technological capabilities and infrastructure investments of the providers.

3-1-3-2 Do mobile data services and retail fixed broadband belong to the same market?

CST has determined that retail mobile broadband and fixed broadband serve different needs and, as a result, are not considered part of the same market. Mobile broadband is typically used on the go, offering variable speeds and data caps, whereas fixed broadband provides stable, high-speed connections that are ideal for bandwidth-intensive activities and multiple users at fixed locations. Additional details can be found below.

3-1-3-2-1 Demand side substitution

Mobile broadband typically doesn't guarantee the high speeds or data allowances provided by fixed broadband solutions from fixed broadband. These support activities requiring more bandwidth, such as HD video streaming, large downloads, and gaming. Mobile plans usually have strict data caps, leading to extra charges or throttled speeds after reaching limits, making them less suited for such high-demand tasks. Fixed broadband often serves multiple users at a fixed location, while mobile broadband is generally used by individuals on the go.

3-1-3-2-2 Supply side substitution

Expanding from mobile to fixed broadband involves significant challenges for Service Providers due to the extensive infrastructure required, such as laying fiber optics or establishing fixed wireless access points, which are both time-consuming and capital-intensive. Conversely, mobile broadband utilizes existing cellular networks, making upgrades more feasible.

3-1-3-3 Do retail fixed broadband services for residential and non-residential customers fall under the same market classification?

CST determines that retail fixed broadband services for both residential and non-residential customers are classified within the same market due to the similar nature of the services and the ability of providers to cater to both segments. More details can be found below.

3-1-3-3-1 Demand side substitution

Both residential and non-residential broadband services share key characteristics such as technology, speeds, and pricing, where applicable. This makes each type potentially interchangeable. For example, when applying a SSNIP test, residential packages might suit small businesses, and corporate plans could be feasible for high-demand home offices, especially if prices for residential services rise slightly.

3-1-3-3-2 Supply side substitution

Broadband providers can easily extend their services to accommodate either residential or non-residential customers. This adaptability is evident as all major operators currently offer broadband across these customer types without significant additional investment or change in infrastructure, reinforcing the unified market classification.

3-1-3-4 Geographic market

CST has not identified any evidence of geographic differentiation in product offerings or pricing for retail broadband within the Kingdom, despite variations in infrastructure availability. Fiber networks, for instance, are not universally accessible, limiting fiber-based broadband to areas where the infrastructure exists. Nevertheless, Open Access agreements are expected to expand these networks' availability for retail services to all Service Providers.

3-1-3-5 Summary of findings for services related to broadband connectivity

The retail fixed broadband services market, spanning nationally, comprises services through fixed infrastructure and wireless infrastructure, and caters to both residential and business customers. It specifically excludes dedicated mobile broadband and internet services provided via leased lines.

3-1-4 Services for FTTx (sub-market)

CST's decision to establish a sub-market for FTTx in the MDDD report is in line with the goals of Vision 2030, which emphasizes the use of advanced fiber technology to enhance modern infrastructure. This prioritization recognizes the significant capabilities of fiber optics in improving data transmission speeds and overall network efficiency.

The decision also aims to focus regulatory efforts on the rapidly expanding FTTx sector, which has experienced the most growth in the telecommunications industry in recent years. By tailoring regulatory remedies specifically for the FTTx market, CST ensures that regulations are effective and relevant, creating an environment that promotes further development.

Furthermore, this strategy acknowledges the substantial investments made by Service Providers in FTTx infrastructure, allowing for separate and more nuanced regulatory remedies. It shifts the focus towards achieving specific FTTx KPIs, addressing previous performance shortcomings, and ensuring continuous improvement in service delivery and network reliability.

In this case, demand-side and supply-side substitution will not be applied as it is a sub-market. As discussed in the previous chapter, substitutes can be found within the retail broadband market.

3-1-4-1 Geographic market

The FTTx deployment across the KSA follows diverse rollout schedules. Yet, the enactment of Open Access agreements throughout the country aims to normalize market dynamics nationally, thereby mitigating the disparities in fiber network availability that stem from varied ownership of the FTTx network in different regions.

Consequently, the geographic scope of the FTTx network assumes a national perspective. Such a geographic evaluation is crucial for devising comprehensive development strategies under the Open Access agreements. This method is dedicated to facilitating consistent FTTx access across the KSA, moving from a period of uneven regional growth towards a unified national approach in broadband infrastructure and service delivery.

3-1-5 Services for leased lines

Leased line products are commonly sought after by two segments: B2B (business-to-business) and B2G (business-to-government). These segments consist of organizations such as large corporations and government agencies that require robust, high-capacity internet connections to facilitate data transmission across multiple sites, both domestically and internationally. These connections typically offer dedicated bandwidth, balanced upload and download speeds, and enhanced service agreements.

Various high-capacity connectivity solutions are available, including traditional Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) leased lines, Ethernet, Fiber for all-IP solutions and alternative technologies like radio links. This market also includes Dedicated Internet Access (DIA) to establish a data connection over MPLS network between a business customer and an ISP for internet access. All these connections are often bundled into comprehensive service packages that may include pseudo Leased Lines (PLL), SD-WAN solutions, VPLS Layer 2, Layer 3 Connectivity Service (IP VPN), DWDM solutions, Cloud Services, VoIP services, and VPNs, all of which are also part of this market.

Large corporations fall within the B2B segment, while government customers belong to the B2G segment. In recent years, the Etimad platform has been introduced for the B2G segment, authorizing six Service Providers to submit bids. Pricing plays a crucial role in the Etimad platform, and those Services Providers offering lower prices have the potential to secure projects. .

3-1-5-1 Do leased line services and retail broadband services fall within the same market category?

Based on the analysis of demand and supply-side substitution, CST has concluded that leased line services and retail broadband services do not belong to the same market category. This distinction arises from significant differences in service functionality, pricing structures, and the infrastructure required to provide these services. Further details are provided below.

3-1-5-1-1 Demand side substitution

The pricing of leased lines is typically customized for each client, suggesting a higher price point driven by the need for specific, higher-quality service requirements. The wholesale cost of these inputs often sets a floor for retail prices, indicating a substantial price differential between leased lines and broadband services. In the retail market, there is some overlap in product features between lower-end leased lines and high-end broadband services, especially those targeted at business customers. However, leased lines are distinct due to their dedicated capacity, minimal contention, enhanced security, and superior SLAs.

These features make it unlikely for a leased line customer to switch to a broadband service, even if they value certain aspects of broadband. A SSNIP test in the retail broadband market would likely not compel leased line users to switch, as the cost of leased lines remains significantly higher than even the increased price of broadband services. CST expects that the introduction of new technologies such as Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) over 5G or advanced fiber optics would not change the perception of leased line customers.

3-1-5-1-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, an operator specializing in leased lines would not typically switch to offering standard retail broadband services over fiber or wireless technology unless it already possesses the necessary infrastructure. The investment and operational adjustments required for such a transition are substantial, making it an unlikely response to a SSNIP in broadband service pricing.

3-1-5-2 Do leased lines, irrespective of bandwidth, fall within a unified market category?

CST concludes that leased lines of different bandwidths are indeed classified within the same product market. The following details provide additional insights.

3-1-5-2-1 Demand substitution

By applying a SSNIP test, it reveals that customers would switch between different bandwidths or combinations of bandwidths if the pricing were lowered. This indicates a potential for demand substitution in the leased line market. Additionally, customers may be inclined to add temporary bandwidth demand, such as during special events or peak business periods.

Leased lines, regardless of their bandwidth, generally serve the same purposes, suggesting that customers have the potential to substitute a high-bandwidth leased line with multiple lower-bandwidth options. While this substitution is technically feasible, it may not be economically practical for customers who require high-capacity connectivity to divide their needs across several lower-bandwidth lines. However, there is a possibility of gradual substitution across the bandwidth spectrum based on specific requirements and changes in pricing.

3-1-5-2-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, providers of leased lines typically have the capability to offer a range of bandwidths, supporting the notion of supply side substitution. This flexibility enables providers to seamlessly cater to diverse market demands. However, conducting a SSNIP test would not provide further insights into this aspect.

3-1-5-3 Do leased lines serving both national and international destinations fall under a single market classification?

CST has concluded that leased lines serving both national and international destinations do fall within the same product market. Further details are provided below.

3-1-5-3-1 Demand side substitution

Customers in the KSA who require connectivity may need links either within the country or to international locations. While national and international leased lines are not direct substitutes, as a customer needing a connection within the KSA would not typically replace it with an international link, they are still classified within the same market category. Conducting a SSNIP test for demand substitution would not provide further insights.

3-1-5-3-2 Supply side substitution

From a supply perspective, the results of an SSNIP test demonstrate that Service Providers offering leased lines have the capability to adjust their service offerings across both national and international markets. This flexibility is facilitated by the availability of wholesale leased line products, which can be utilized to seamlessly adapt their services between national and international leased lines.

3-1-5-4 Geographic market

Customers that purchase leased lines are typically concentrated in specific geographic areas. The B2G segment, which caters to governmental offices, is more prevalent in regions with such offices, while the B2B segment is concentrated in areas where large businesses are located. Consequently, operators tend to invest in areas with a high density of leased line customers, particularly in regions with a significant concentration of B2G customers. Despite these geographic considerations, CST has not discovered any evidence of stable geographic boundaries or differing competition conditions that would justify the division of markets based on geography. Additionally, CST has not identified any evidence of price variations or differences in product features based on geography, although prices and features for retail leased lines are typically negotiated on a case-by-case basis with customers.

3-1-5-5 Summary of findings for services related to leased lines

The retail leased lines market covers a wide range of circuits with varying bandwidths. It includes retail leased lines that connect to all destinations, both within the Kingdom and internationally. These leased lines cater to both businesses (B2B) and public sector (B2G) customers. The geographic scope of the retail leased lines market is national, meaning that these services are available and can be provided across the entire country.

3-1-6 Services for mobile services

In the KSA, mobile services encompass a variety of offerings, including voice communication, SMS, and data transmission capabilities, available via both prepaid and postpaid contracts. These services cater to residential and commercial customers and are provided by mobile operators who typically bundle telecom products (such as voice calls, SMS, and data) and non-telecom products (such as streaming services) into a single, convenient package. Customers can access mobile services across both national and international borders.

Despite the varying preferences of consumers, the bundled nature of these services makes it difficult for users to select individual features from different Service Providers(e.g., separate voice and data services). As a result, choices are often influenced more by the overall cost of the bundle rather than the price of individual components.

3-1-6-1 Do post-paid and pre-paid services fall under the same market classification?

CST has determined that both pre-paid and post-paid services are classified within the same retail mobile services market. Refer to the sub-sections below for more details.

3-1-6-1-1 Demand side substitution

From a demand-side perspective, both pre-paid and post-paid services are considered part of the same market. Customers have the option to choose between pre-paid and post-paid contracts for mobile services, and switching between the two is generally feasible. CST acknowledges that several factors may influence customers' willingness and ability to switch, particularly in response to a SSNIP test. For instance, post-paid users may face contractual constraints and associated costs if they decide to switch services prematurely. On the other hand, pre-paid users often value the flexibility of their plans and may be deterred from switching to post-paid. Another significant factor that can impact customers' switching behavior is the presence of customer loyalty programs. These programs serve as a tool to assess the extent to which incentives affect customers' decisions to switch.

3-1-6-1-2 Supply side substitution

From the supply side, mobile operators who currently offer only pre-paid or post-paid services could potentially provide the alternative option in response to a SSNIP. The technical aspects of network provision and service delivery remain consistent across both types, with the primary differences lying in billing procedures. This enables a quick and cost-effective transition between service types. The regulatory landscape, ease of offering both types of services, and technological advancements have streamlined these transitions for mobile operators.

3-1-6-2 Do dedicated mobile broadband services fall within the scope of the retail mobile services market?

CST has determined that dedicated mobile broadband services are integrated within the retail mobile services market, as all mobile operators in the KSA include mobile broadband as part of their comprehensive service offerings. Additional details can be found below.

3-1-6-2-1 Demand side substitution

From the perspective of a customer with a retail mobile subscription, dedicated mobile broadband is not considered a complete substitute. This is mainly because a general mobile subscription offers a broader range of services, including voice and SMS, which are not solely provided by mobile broadband.

3-1-6-2-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, mobile operators in the KSA have the ability to seamlessly incorporate dedicated mobile broadband services into their offerings by utilizing existing mobile network infrastructures. Conducting a SSNIP test may not provide additional insights since mobile operators already provide dedicated mobile broadband, but they can adjust the data limits of their bundles as a result of a SSNIP test. This confirms their inclusion in the same market.

3-1-6-3 Do OTT services act as substitutes for traditional mobile services?

CST concludes that OTT services, due to the lack of significant demand and supply-side substitution, do not form part of the retail mobile services market. Further details can be found in the sub-sections.

3-1-6-3-1 Demand side substitution

While some mobile service users may opt for OTT apps for voice or messaging instead of traditional mobile calls or SMS, this choice depends on factors such as having suitable data plans, compatible devices, and favorable connectivity conditions. These factors impose limitations on the number of users who can realistically switch to OTT services, thereby reducing their overall substitution impact. The increasing popularity of OTT services highlights their role in complementing rather than replacing traditional mobile services. Although OTT calls require an existing mobile data subscription, they enhance the mobile experience by offering additional functionalities rather than substituting core services.

In a SSNIP test, users might rely more on OTT services. However, most users would still maintain their mobile plans, which typically include voice, SMS, and data, with the additional costs for OTT calls. This suggests that switching to OTT services would primarily impact specific use cases, such as international calls, rather than overall mobile services.

3-1-6-3-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, it is improbable that OTT Service Providers would shift to offering traditional mobile services in response to a SSNIP. This transition necessitates significant network infrastructure and investment, which pose substantial barriers to entry. Instead, mobile operators have explored partnerships with OTT providers to bundle services, thereby enhancing their offerings and mitigating the competitive threat posed by OTT services.

3-1-6-4 Do Satellite communication services act as substitutes for traditional mobile services?

CST has determined that Satellite communications services are not considered part of the retail mobile services market, primarily due to the lack of significant demand and the absence of supply-side substitution. For more detailed information, refer to the sub-sections.

3-1-6-4-1 Demand side substitution

Satellite communications offer a valuable solution for providing communication services to mobile users in under-populated regions, emergency areas, and on planes, trains, and ships. In these scenarios, satellite systems possess unique capabilities such as robustness, wide area coverage, and broadcast/multicast capabilities. However, mobile users with good coverage may not find satellite communications appealing due to the price difference

During a SSNIP test, it is unlikely that many users of traditional mobile services would switch to satellite communications plans unless it is necessary in specific regions due to poor Service Level agreements (SLAs) from MNOs.

3-1-6-4-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, it is highly improbable for satellite communications providers to offer traditional mobile services due to the substantial sunk costs associated with establishing a mobile network in the KSA. The same is true for traditional mobile network operators, as they would also face high sunk costs if they were to venture into delivering satellite communication services.

3-1-6-5 Do retail mobile services for residential and non-residential customers fall within the same market?

CST concludes that, due to the feasibility of both demand and supply-side substitution, retail mobile services for residential and non-residential customers belong to the same product market. Additional information can be found below.

3-1-6-5-1 Demand side substitution

The mobile services offered to both residential and business customers provide similar functionalities, although there may be differences in the bundling of services and associated pricing. Whether they are individual consumers or small business owners, customers typically select service plans based on specific needs such as data usage or call volume, indicating a significant overlap in the services that appeal to both segments.

3-1-6-5-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, a provider specializing in non-residential mobile services could easily expand their offerings to include residential users, and vice versa, providers focused on residential services could cater to business clients. The main differences in serving these customer groups revolve around marketing strategies and billing practices rather than the technical aspects of service delivery. This suggests that transitioning between these markets can be done quickly and with minimal cost.

3-1-6-6 Geographic market

Mobile Service Providers in the KSA are nationally licensed and must meet specific geographic and population coverage standards. While an operator's network may not cover the entire KSA, national roaming agreements ensure service availability countrywide, further supporting the classification of the mobile services market as national in scope.
3-1-6-7 Summary of findings for services related to mobile services

The retail mobile services market can be characterized by the inclusion of all retail mobile services, such as access, voice, SMS, and data, as well as dedicated mobile broadband services. This encompasses both pre-paid and post-paid mobile services provided to both residential and non-residential customers. Additionally, the geographic scope of the retail mobile services market is national.

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[6] Fixed infrastructure includes technologies such as PSTN, ISDN, xDSL, FTTx, among others, while wireless infrastructure includes technologies such as FWA or WiMax, among others.

[7] This does not include mobile networks, that do not fall whithis this defined market for retail fixed access and calls.

[8] Dedicated mobile broadband data services refer to dedicated data services over a mobile network that allow access to the greater Internet. These services are purchased separately from voice services, either as a stand-alone service (for example, using a data card such as a USB modem/dongle) or as an add-on data package to voice services, which requires an additional subscription.

Definition of Wholesale markets

3-2 Definition of Wholesale markets

3-2-1 Introduction

CST has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the wholesale services available in the KSA, similar to the analysis conducted for the retail markets. It is important to note that these wholesale services are upstream services that support the retail markets, but the relationship between retail and wholesale services is not a strict one-to-one correspondence. In some cases, a single retail service may rely on multiple wholesale services, while a particular wholesale service may be essential for several distinct retail services. The wholesale services can be categorized into the following groups:

• Wholesale local access and physical infrastructure services

• Wholesale fixed broadband access services

• Wholesale fixed call transit services

• Wholesale fixed call termination services

• Wholesale leased lines services for terminating segments

• Wholesale leased lines for trunk segments

• Wholesale mobile access and call origination (MACO)

• Wholesale mobile termination

• Wholesale MVNO Host services

Once these initial groups of services are established, boundaries will be set using demand-side substitution and supply-side substitution. These boundaries will help identify the wholesale markets that will undergo testing in the Three Criteria Test. It is important to note that if a wholesale service, due to its unique nature, cannot be easily substituted, this will also be taken into consideration during the evaluation process.

3-2-2 Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure

The wholesale local access and physical infrastructure services play a vital role in supporting all retail markets, including mobile services. They encompass a range of wholesale local access, including products across copper, fiber, and FWA networks, LLU, SLU and VULA. Additionally, they include access to passive infrastructure, which includes ducts, colocation, and other associated facilities like manholes, cable landing points, towers, masts, buildings, sites, as well as necessary utilities like power and air conditioning. Other services offered in this market include colocation in Cable Landing Stations, Dark Fiber Access, IBS Sharing Service, DC Services, and Metro Connect Service, among others.

This market is crucial for delivering services such as access, calls, broadband, leased lines, and mobile services that are in high demand by retail customers. Without regulations for Interconnection and Access to physical facilities, a market for wholesale local fixed access and physical infrastructure may not develop independently. This is because Service Providers tend to prioritize their own retail services over supplying wholesale products to other Service Providers.

To analyze this market, we begin by identifying products that could influence the pricing strategies of a hypothetical monopolist in wholesale fixed access services. This involves evaluating alternative wholesale offerings as direct competitors and considering the competitive pressure from vertically integrated operators that may indirectly affect monopoly pricing. Furthermore, we establish the boundaries of the market by assessing whether all services and products belong to the same market, considering factors related to both demand and supply-side substitution.

3-2-2-1 Does the presence of a vertically integrated supplier in the retail market indirectly limit competition in wholesale local access and physical infrastructure?

CST does not consider the indirect constraints from vertically integrated operators offering retail services on mobile or fixed platforms to be relevant for market definition. CST treats Service Providers (SPs) with vertical integration and those without it as part of the same market. Additional details are explained below.

3-2-2-1-1 Demand side substitution

When evaluating the impact of a vertically integrated supplier on competition in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market, CST applies a SSNIP test to assess potential demand-side substitution. This test examines whether an increase in wholesale prices might cause retail consumers to switch to an alternative Service Provider, indirectly limiting competition. For this effect to be substantial, several conditions must be met: the wholesale price increase must be fully passed through to retail prices, there must be a significant willingness among consumers to switch to other SPs, and minimal migration of consumers to the integrated supplier's retail arm.

However, the analysis suggests that if these conditions are not entirely met, particularly the complete pass-through of cost increases and significant consumer readiness to switch, the power of demand-side substitution to constrain wholesale pricing may be limited.

3-2-2-1-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, CST considers how adjustments in wholesale prices impact the competitive landscape, especially when a supplier operates in both wholesale and retail markets. While wholesale access prices play a crucial role in retail pricing, suppliers may choose not to fully pass on these price increments to consumers, thereby reducing the potential impact of a SSNIP.

Additionally, the presence of a vertically integrated supplier may create an incentive structure where wholesale price increases are partially absorbed or subsidized through its retail operations, potentially distorting the natural competitive pressures faced by a typical supplier.

This situation indicates an indirect constraint from vertically integrated operators, highlighting the need for further ex ante measures that prevent market dominance scenarios.

3-2-2-2 Are services provided over copper, fiber, and FWA considered within the same wholesale local access and physical infrastructure product market?

CST determines that services provided over copper, fiber, and FWA are grouped into the same wholesale local access and physical infrastructure product market, based on the SSNIP test for demand-side substitution. This grouping reflects a high degree of interchangeability from the consumer's viewpoint, suggesting a unified market despite different underlying technologies. Notably, the market definition also includes access to technology-neutral passive infrastructure such as ducts, towers, and manholes, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to market categorization.

3-2-2-2-1 Demand side substitution

CST recognizes the significance of aligning the structure of wholesale markets for local access and physical infrastructure with their corresponding retail markets. This approach ensures consistency and acknowledges that different technologies offer similar wholesale products. By conducting a SSNIP test on the demand side across access provided over copper, fiber, and FWA networks, it becomes evident that these technologies are easily interchangeable.

In reality, LLU and SLU are commonly associated with copper networks, while VULA and dark fiber provision are typically found in fiber networks. The inclusion of passive infrastructures such as ducts, towers, manholes, cable landing points, and facilities for colocation, power, and air conditioning further enhances the dynamics of this market.

3-2-2-2-2 Supply side substitution

Supply side substitution involves a supplier entering the market with a wholesale local access and physical infrastructure product in response to a SSNIP. However, CST believes that without a regulatory obligation and significant investment in an access network, it is unlikely for such a wholesale product to be made available in the short term.

3-2-2-3 Geographic market

In the Kingdom, wholesale local access and physical infrastructure products are consistently available across the STC network for both fixed and mobile infrastructure products, as well as Integrated Dawiyat's networks for fixed infrastructure products. There is no variation in pricing policy based on geographic location. However, the availability of certain fiber services is dependent on the presence of a fiber network in a particular area.

CST acknowledges that the deployment of fiber infrastructure in specific areas, as directed by the Fiber Optic Delivery Regulations, has a significant impact on market definitions and competitive conditions during market reviews. Investments in fiber infrastructure enable operators to introduce new services in those regions. Therefore, areas benefiting from fiber deployment are on par with other regions in terms of the availability of wholesale products, pricing, and the presence of active operators.

Taking these factors into consideration, CST determines that the market for wholesale local access and physical infrastructure should be evaluated at a regional level, considering the diverse infrastructure landscapes across different areas.

3-2-2-4 Summary of findings for services related to Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure services

The market for wholesale local access and physical infrastructure encompasses both mobile and fixed infrastructure. It includes a range of products provided over copper, fiber, and FWA networks, such as LLU, SLU, VULA, and access to dark fiber. Additionally, it encompasses access to physical infrastructure, including ducts, colocation facilities, manholes, cable landing points, towers, masts, buildings, sites, power, and air conditioning. Other services offered in this market include colocation in Cable Landing Stations, Dark Fiber Access, IBS Sharing Service, DC Services, and Metro Connect Service, among others

The presence of indirect constraints at the retail level from a vertically integrated supplier is not deemed significant enough to warrant their inclusion in the market. The geographic scope of the market for wholesale local access and physical infrastructure is regional.

3-2-3 Wholesale (Fixed) Broadband Access Services

Open Access measures have been implemented in the Kingdom, allowing fixed telecom operators to enter agreements that enable all Service Providers to access FTTx networks. This framework enables operators to offer retail FTTx services even if they do not own the infrastructure, either by securing wholesale bitstream services or utilizing networks owned by other operators.

Wholesale broadband access encompasses services used to supply retail broadband services. An access seeker, when using a Bitstream product to deliver a retail broadband service, must determine the extent to which the service will rely on its own network versus the provider's network. Bitstream services can be provided at various handover points, such as DSLAM, ATM, or IP, which impact the level of control the access seeker has over the parameters of the retail products offered.

To effectively deliver retail broadband services, Service Providers must ensure that consumers have sufficient transmission capacity to support bi-directional data flow at appropriate speeds. In contrast to wholesale local access products, a Service Provider can obtain wholesale bitstream access at a more central layer in the architecture, which includes broadband equipment and some elements of backhauling and handover but excludes local access to the network.

3-2-3-1 Are copper, fiber, and FWA-based wholesale broadband access services considered part of the same product market?

CST considers that wholesale broadband access products provided over copper, fiber, and FWA networks fall within the same market as they mirror retail broadband services.

3-2-3-2 Does the presence of a vertically integrated supplier in the retail market indirectly restrict competition in wholesale access?

CST has analyzed the pass-through of a price increase from wholesale to retail. Even if a supplier passes on the entire price increase to the retail customer, a SSNIP of 5-10% in the price of Bitstream would result in a retail price increase of 3-6%. CST believes that switching behavior at the retail level in response to a diluted wholesale price increase would not sufficiently constrain the wholesale broadband access supplier. Additionally, there may be some switching to the wholesale supplier's retail arm, as it may not pass on the wholesale price increase. Therefore, CST does not consider the indirect constraints from vertically integrated operators offering retail services on other platforms to be relevant at this stage of the analysis.

3-2-3-3 Geographic market

CST notes that the implementation of the Fiber Optic Delivery Regulations has led to regional rollouts of fiber-based Bitstream services by operators. Therefore, CST concludes that the wholesale fixed broadband access service market should be analyzed on a regional basis.

3-2-3-4 Summary of findings for services related to Wholesale Broadband Access services

The wholesale broadband access market includes WBA products based on copper, fiber and FWA. Indirect constraints from vertically integrated suppliers at the retail level are not significant enough to be included in the market.

The geographic scope of the wholesale broadband access market is regional.

3-2-4 Wholesale transit services

Retail voice services rely on the integration of wholesale call origination, transit, and termination. Effective connections between originating and terminating networks are crucial, especially when direct interconnection is not available. Wholesale transit services bridge this gap by ensuring seamless end-to-end connectivity. They facilitate the transmission and routing of calls within an operator's network and aim for successful call termination. Additionally, they serve as a vital conduit between networks, linking points of interconnection from both the originating and terminating ends.

On a broader scale, transit services extend their reach to accommodate both national and international traffic, particularly within the KSA. CST governs transit activities within the Kingdom, including those that extend to international gateways. STC plays a dual role in providing transit services, not only for its own retail operations but also for other operators. This places STC's activities squarely within the wholesale transit market. As a result, all types of calls, whether from fixed access or mobile services, are recognized as part of this comprehensive wholesale market.

Transit services encompass a wide range of operations that facilitate the movement of voice data across different network infrastructures. They are critical for managing VoIP calls transmitted via various technologies such as copper, fiber, FWA, and mobile networks. Efficient handling of these services ensures that operators can maintain connectivity even in the absence of direct interconnections. This capability is essential for delivering high-quality communication services and sustaining the robustness and flexibility of the telecommunications infrastructure. As a result, transit services have no direct substitutes, establishing a distinct market for related services and products.

3-2-4-1 Geographic market

Since this market addresses the national retail fixed and mobile access and calls markets, the market for wholesale transit services is also national in scope.

3-2-4-2 Summary of findings for services related to Wholesale Transit services

The market for wholesale transit encompasses various aspects, including self-supply of transit services, transit of national and international traffic originating in the KSA, and transit of traffic up to and including international gateways. This market operates on a national scale, serving the geographic scope of the Kingdom.

3-2-5 Wholesale Fixed Call Termination

Wholesale fixed call termination services are essential for operators to enable their customers to make calls to end-users across different interconnected networks. In the KSA, conducting a demand or supply side analysis for wholesale fixed call termination does not yield any possible substitutions. The network operator that terminates the call holds exclusive control over its own number range, effectively creating a monopoly on terminating calls to its numbers.

In the KSA, as well as in most other countries, the prevailing principle is the Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle. This means that the wholesale termination rate, determined by the called network, is charged to the calling network. Calls to fixed end-users are directed to geographic numbers and terminated by the network operator that controls the termination point, typically the network of the called party. On the other hand, calls to Service Providers often utilize non-geographic numbers, such as '800' for freephone services or '700' for Quality Information Service Providers.

Unlike other wholesale markets, a new entrant cannot access the fixed call termination market because it cannot be replicated at a technical level. This makes it impossible for another Service Provider to offer a similar termination service by developing their own infrastructure.

3-2-5-1 Geographic market

As this market addresses the retail fixed access and calls market, and that market is national in scope, it follows that the market for wholesale call termination services is also national in scope.

3-2-5-2 Summary of findings for the Wholesale Fixed Call Termination services

The market for wholesale fixed call termination encompasses the termination of calls from all fixed and mobile operators, covering all types of calls. This market operates on a national scale, serving the geographic scope of the country.

3-2-6 Wholesale Leased Lines

In the KSA, there is a regulatory distinction between terminating segments and trunk segments of leased lines due to their provision over different parts of the network. Wholesale terminating segments specifically refer to the access network, while wholesale trunk segments pertain to the core network capacity. A terminating segment typically connects an end-user's site to the purchasing operator's network node, allowing for the creation of an end-to-end service using a combination of wholesale inputs and the operator's network. Additionally, a terminating segment can also serve as backhaul between a local access node and the purchasing operator's core network. On the other hand, a trunk segment refers to a leased line carried over aggregated links between major network nodes. Trunk segments are utilized to connect main urban centers with concentrated demand for leased lines and high volumes of traffic between them.

Wholesale leased lines share technical similarities with retail leased lines and serve various purposes, including reselling to retail organizations and enhancing the purchasing operator's own infrastructure. Furthermore, operators can leverage wholesale terminating segments of leased lines to establish connections to international gateways. It is important to note that the provision of leased lines within the KSA encompasses connectivity up to and including international gateways.

3-2-6-1 Do wireless and fixed leased lines fall under the same market classification?

CST concludes that wired and wireless leased lines fall under the same market classification due to a degree of demand-side substitution.

3-2-6-1-1 Demand side substitution

The demand-side analysis reveals that wireless leased lines have the capability to offer bandwidths up to 10 Gbps, although they are typically sold at lower speeds. Wired and wireless leased lines share similar product characteristics and pricing, making them potential substitutes for customers. In cases where a purchaser of wired leased lines does not require higher capacities, wireless leased lines can serve as a suitable alternative, provided they are available.

However, it is important to note that the provision of wireless leased lines relies on factors such as access to radio spectrum and line-of-sight between wireless service end points. Additionally, congestion can be a concern in the same geographic area. CST acknowledges that mobile operators are significant customers of both wired and wireless leased lines, particularly for backhaul purposes. In remote locations where wired infrastructure is unavailable and the traffic load on backhaul is lower, wireless circuits may be preferred.

3-2-6-1-2 Supply side substitution

On the supply side, it is worth considering that an operator offering wireless leased lines would face substantial investment costs if they were to switch to providing wired leased lines using fixed infrastructure. This highlights the differences in infrastructure requirements between the two types of leased lines.

3-2-6-2 Do leased lines across all bandwidth ranges constitute a single market segment?

CST has determined that wholesale products encompassing both the terminating segment and trunk segment of leased lines across all bandwidths should be categorized within a unified product market. Additional details are described below.

3-2-6-2-1 Demand side substitution

From the demand side, CST believes that there is functional substitutability between different bandwidths of leased lines in both the wholesale and retail markets. Wholesale customers for both trunk and terminating segments of leased lines could potentially be satisfied by a single service or multiples of lower bandwidth services, indicating demand-side substitutability.

3-2-6-2-2 Supply side substitution

The analysis reveals that there exists supply-side substitutability across all bandwidths of leased lines. This can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, operators who provide leased line products for both the terminating segment and trunk segment have access to the necessary physical network infrastructure. Once this infrastructure is in place, it has the capability to support leased lines of varying bandwidths and interfaces. Additionally, the determination of specific bandwidths and interfaces occurs at the connection points to the end user or the alternative operator's network. This flexibility allows for seamless adjustments and enables supply-side substitutability across the entire range of leased line bandwidths.

3-2-6-3 Geographic market

CST observes similarity in competitive conditions across trunk and termination segments in the KSA. However, alternative operators are more inclined to build the new leased lines network in areas with a high density of large businesses and governmental agencies. CST's analysis anticipates a rise in competition for terminating segments in those areas.

CST has not observed any pricing differentiation in either products or pricing of wholesale terminating or trunk segment leased lines across different regions. Additionally, no significant competitive differences have been identified on high-traffic routes, supporting the definition of a single geographic market.

3-2-6-4 Summary of findings for wholesale leased lines

The markets for both the trunk segments and the terminating segments of leased lines are distinct yet national in scope, encompassing leased lines of all bandwidths as well as both wired and wireless connections.

3-2-7 Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination (MACO)

Wholesale mobile access and call origination services include wholesale national roaming, Fiber to the tower (FTTT), Coverage as a Service (CaaS), among others. In the KSA, all three Mobile Network Operators self-supply MACO services and Tawal offers FTTT and CaaS services.

3-2-7-1 Geographic market

Previously, CST differentiated between geographic markets based on Universal Service (US) areas, considering the long-term nature of US contracts. However, despite this segmentation, CST has not found convincing evidence of distinct geographic markets within specific areas of the Kingdom. As a result, CST's analysis concludes that the scope of the MACO market is national since MNOs can provide services across the entire Kingdom and access seekers aspire to offer the services nationally.

3-2-7-2 Summary of findings for wholesale mobile access and call origination services

The market for wholesale mobile access and call origination includes Wholesale national roaming and Self-supply by mobile operators at the national level.

3-2-8 Wholesale Mobile Termination

Due to technical constraints, terminating services (calls, video calls, SMS, MMS, etc.) can only be terminated on the network of the operator to which the recipient is subscribed, making it impossible for another Service Provider to offer a substitute by either investing in infrastructure or purchasing wholesale services. Consequently, there are no technical substitutes for wholesale mobile termination, leading to a lack of demand and supply side substitutability. Each mobile operator effectively holds a monopoly on terminations within their own network, with pricing determined by the operator that issues the mobile numbers. Although both MNOs and MVNOs control their termination rates, calls to MVNOs are still routed through the host MNO's network. Technically, MVNOs could set their own termination fees, but this is contingent on their host agreements.

In scenarios where a SSNIP test is introduced, there are no wholesale demand side substitutes available. This means that a call or message intended for a specific user cannot be replaced by one to a different user. Even if a rise in termination rates is noticeable at the retail level, potentially discouraging consumers from making calls, this does not imply a substitution at the wholesale level, nor does it support broadening the wholesale termination market's definition. Therefore, the relevant market remains confined to each operator’s network, independent of how retail markets are defined.

3-2-8-1 Geographic market

Aligning with the national scope of the retail mobile services market, the geographic extent of the wholesale termination market on a mobile network is also national.

3-2-8-2 Summary of findings for wholesale mobile termination services

The wholesale termination market on a mobile network encompasses the termination of all services to allocated mobile numbers, the termination of services from any licensed operator regardless of where the communication originates, and the termination by any operator capable of setting its own termination rates. The geographic scope of this market is uniformly national.

3-2-9 Wholesale MVNO Host services

3-2-9-1 Market background

Wholesale MVNO Host services encompass a wide range of services that are exclusively available to MVNO providers with agreements with established MNOs. These services include voice origination, video calling, SMS and MMS origination, service termination, bulk SMS distribution, data traffic, and more.

In the 2020 MDDD edition, MVNO services were included as part of the MACO services (call origination). These wholesale agreements between MNOs and MVNOs typically cover various services beyond call origination, such as call termination, SMS, MMS, data traffic, and special data transfer agreements for charging and billing.
3-2-9-2 Do MVNO Host services fall within the MACO market segment?

3-2-9-2-1 Demand side substitution

MVNO Host services offer a comprehensive suite of functionalities, including call origination, voice termination, video calls, SMS and MMS origination, and data traffic services, among others. In contrast, Mobile Access and Call Origination services primarily focus on providing Service Providers with the means to initiate calls and access mobile networks.

While there are some common characteristics between the two services, such as enabling voice and data communication, MVNO Host services have a broader scope and scale. Seekers looking for a comprehensive telecommunication solution, including both origination and termination services, would find MVNO Host services more suitable.

3-2-9-2-2 Supply side substitution

From a supply perspective, providers of MVNO Host services, typically MNOs, also offer Mobile Access and Call Origination services. However, this does not represent an expansion in capabilities, as these services already encompass network infrastructure, service agreements, and technical support systems.

While there is some overlap in the range of services provided by MVNO Host offerings and MACO services, MVNO Host services cater to a wider array of requirements for MVNOs. Therefore, it can be concluded that they belong to separate product markets.

3-2-9-3 Geographic market

The MVNO Host Service market is the upstream market that provides services to MVNOs for serving customers on a retail level. MVNOs are licensed to offer mobile services nationally. Therefore, CST's conclusion is that the scope of the MVNO Host service market is national.

3-2-9-4 Summary of findings for Wholesale MVNO host services

The market for MVNO Host services includes wholesale call origination, video-call, SMS and MMS origination services, termination services, bulk SMS and data traffic at a national level.

The Three Criteria Test (3CT)

4. The Three Criteria Test (3CT)

4-1 3CT for Retail markets

4-1-1 M1: Retail Fixed Access and Calls

Based on the findings of the 3CT, the market for retail fixed access and calls is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, limited roll-out of infrastructure from relatively smaller SPs, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the susceptibility analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	High entry barriers	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope, and density benefits incumbent telephone network. Entry into the market through the construction of one's own infrastructure entails substantial investment and incurs large sunk costs. Limited availability of wholesale of fixed access products that could allow the entrance to new entrants.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Continuing decline in legacy calls and limited roll-out of infrastructure from relatively smaller SPs (e.g., Salam and Go). Implementation of 2020 remedies has prevented DSPs from engaging in anti-competitive behavior. These measures, however, need more time to fully reach their potential.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	In the absence of any ex ante regulation, a dominant operator might engage in entry deterring practices that would erect or reinforce barriers to entry that would protect its dominant position against potential, or actual, entrants.

Exhibit 4.1.1: Retail fixed access and calls: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-1-2 M2: Retail Fixed Broadband Services

Characterized by significant entry barriers, the market for retail fixed broadband services demonstrates a susceptibility to ex ante regulation based on the 3CT analysis. Without such regulatory measures, the dynamics could disproportionately benefit the Dominant Service Provider, potentially undermining the market's competitive landscape and consumer interests. Details of the 3CT are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	High entry barriers	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope, and density in retail fixed broadband. Entry into the market through building one's own infrastructure requires significant levels of investment & large sunk costs. Entry could take place through wholesale fixed broadband access products if in place and if effective.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Full implementation of the Open Access measures could reduce market entry barriers and fostering competition, though achieving its full potential will take more time. Considering competition based on its own infrastructure, it is unlikely that alternative SPs will increase their market shares over the next few years to reach effective competition. Implementation of 2020 remedies has prevented DSPs from engaging in anti-competitive behavior. These measures, however, need more time to fully reach their potential.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	In the absence of any ex ante regulation, a dominant operator might engage in entry deterring practices that would erect or reinforce barriers to entry that would protect its dominant position against potential, or actual, entrants.

Exhibit 4.1.2: Retail fixed broadband: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-1-3 M2.1: Retail FTTx Broadband Services

The retail FTTx Broadband market is known for having significant barriers to entry and no tendency towards competition, making it susceptible to ex ante regulation based on the 3CT analysis. It will take more time for Open Access measures to enable the market to reach its full potential. Without regulatory measures in place, the Dominant Service Provider has the potential to undermine the market's competitive environment and consumer interests. Details of the 3CT are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	High entry barriers	Large economies of scale, investment and sunk costs. Entry into the market through building one's own infrastructure requires significant levels of investment & large sunk costs. Entry could take place through wholesale fixed broadband access products, if in place and effective.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Full implementation of the Open Access measures is reducing market entry barriers and fostering competition, though achieving its full potential will take more time. Considering competition based on its own FTTx network, it is unlikely that alternative SPs will increase their market shares over the next few years to reach effective competition.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	Dealing with dominance practices after they occur can be more costly for the affected parties than taking preventive measures in advance. Additionally, ex post regulation may take time to implement corrective actions.

Exhibit 4.1.3: FTTx Broadband Services: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-1-4 M3: Retail leased lines

As indicated by the 3CT, the retail leased lines market has significant entry barriers in the B2B segment. However, there is a potential for competition in the B2G segment with the introduction of the Etimad platform for selected Service Providers, although it will require more time to fully develop. Without ex ante regulation, there is a risk of undermining the market's competitive landscape and consumer interests. Therefore, retail leased lines market is susceptible to ex ante regulation. Details of the 3CT analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	In the B2B segment, significant economies of scale, scope, and density in telephone networks present high entry barriers. Constructing one's infrastructure for market entry demands substantial investment and results in large sunk costs. In the B2B segment, entry is possible through wholesale leased lines products if available and effective, yet challenges remain in accessing and sharing these products despite sufficient supply. In the B2G segment, market entry is not possible due to the fact that only six SPs have been selected for the Etimad Platform, exclusively allowing them to conduct sales to the government.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition for B2B and B2G segments	In the B2B segment, limited competition exists due to economies of scale, with little expectation for significant shifts in market shares among alternative SPs in the near future. The B2G segment sees a potential shift towards competition with the introduction of the Etimad platform, marking a positive development towards competitive dynamics. Despite the Etimad platform in B2G, the market remains in early stages of development, with the future impact and effectiveness of the platform still uncertain.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	In the absence of any ex ante regulation, a dominant operator might engage in entry deterring practices that would erect or reinforce barriers. to entry that would protect its dominant position against potential, or actual, entrants.

Exhibit 4.1.4: Retail leased lines susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-1-5 M4: Retail Mobile services

According to the results of the 3CT, retail mobile services market failed the Three Criteria Test, since ex post regulation in the last period has proven to be effective in the retail market, meaning that the retail mobile services is not susceptible to ex ante regulation. Details of the 3CT analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high, although mitigated to some extent by the possibility of MVNO entry/expansion	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope, and density in mobile telephone networks. Entry into the market through building one's own infrastructure requires significant levels of investment & large sunk costs. A new MNO entrant would require access to spectrum and to build a network.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition although mitigated by the introduction of new MVNOs	Entry via wholesale MVNO is feasible with the introduction of 2 new MVNOs in the period 2021-2023, although their presence remains limited. Indicators for market concentration, such as HHI, have remained stable during the period.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention considered sufficient	Ex post regulation in the retail mobile services has proven to be effective in the last few years.

Exhibit 4.1.5: Retail mobile services: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2 3CT for Wholesale markets

4-2-1 M5: Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure

According to the 3CT, the market for wholesale local access and physical infrastructure is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The presence of entry barriers, absence of competitive trends, and inadequate ex post interventions all suggest that without regulatory oversight, the market dynamics may favor the Dominant Service Provider, which could negatively impact overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the 3CT analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope and density in establishing access networks. Strong structural barriers to entry and expansion. Service depends on ownership of an access network. Entry into the market through building own infrastructure requires significant levels of investment & large sunk costs.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Availability of alternative networks through fiber optic delivery is increasing, but achieving full coverage is not expected at the time of writing this report. Implementation of the Access to Physical infrastructure and Interconnection regulations has improved competition, but it needs more time to be materialized. Implementation of 2020 remedies has prevented DSP from engaging in anti-competitive behavior.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	In the absence of ex ante remedies, a dominant Service Provider could engage in refusal to supply or discriminatory pricing, that would have damaging consequences for access seekers.

Exhibit 4.2.1: Wholesale local access and physical infrastructure: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-2 M6: Wholesale Fixed Broadband Access Services

According to the analysis conducted using the 3CT, the market for wholesale fixed broadband access services is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of tendency towards competition, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope and density in establishing access networks. Service depends on ownership of an access network. Entry into the market through building own infrastructure requires significant levels of investment & large sunk costs.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Fiber optic delivery regulations are increasing fiber rollouts from alternative SPs, although the impact is limited at the time of the report. Competition likely to be from self-supply of new fiber networks. Implementation of the Open Access measures and the Physical Access and Interconnection regulations is going to increase competition. Implementation of 2020 remedies has prevented DSPs from engaging in anti-competitive behavior. These measures, however, need more time to fully reach their potential.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	In the absence of ex ante remedies, a dominant Service Provider could engage in refusal to supply or discriminatory pricing, that would have damaging consequences for access seekers.

Exhibit 4.2.2: Wholesale fixed broadband access: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-3 M7: Wholesale Transit Services

In accordance with the 3CT, the market for wholesale transit market is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of competitive trends, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope and density in establishing transit networks. Service depends on ownership of an access network. Entering the market by constructing one's own infrastructure demands substantial investment and incurs significant sunk costs.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Competition is likely to be from self-supply of transit services. Fiber optic delivery regulations are increasing fiber rollouts from alternative SPs, although the impact is limited at the time of the report. Unlikely to be new demand for wholesale transit for legacy switched calls due to the transition to all-IP technology, coupled with the increase in mobile and OTT calls.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	Refusing to supply or implementing discriminatory pricing for wholesale transit services could have immediate detrimental effects for access seekers, who rely on it as a crucial upstream input for their retail operations.

Exhibit 4.2.3: Wholesale transit market: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-4 M8: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination Services

As per the insights from the 3CT, the market for wholesale fixed call termination services is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of competitive trends, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Every fixed operator controls access to its subscribers via wholesale fixed voice call termination. There are unavoidable technical barriers to entry
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	The market is a structural monopoly
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	Strong structural barriers to entry and expansion Ex post intervention is likely to be too slow to address these concerns effectively

Exhibit 4.2.4: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination market: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-5 M9: Wholesale Terminating Segments of Leased Lines Services

According to the results of the 3CT, the market for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines services is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of competitive trends, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope and density in establishing access networks. Entry into the market through building own infrastructure requires significant levels of investment & large sunk costs.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Competition likely to be from self-supply of new fiber networks. While investment in alternative networks is increasing this is still limited. Implementation of 2020 remedies has prevented DSPs from engaging in anti-competitive behavior. These measures, however, need more time to fully reach their potential.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	As a key upstream input for competitors at the retail level, refusal to supply or discriminatory pricing could have immediate damaging consequences for access seekers. Ex post intervention is likely to be too slow to address these concerns effectively.

Exhibit 4.2.5: Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-6 M10: Wholesale Trunk Segments of Leased Lines Services

As indicated by the 3CT, the market for wholesale trunk segments of leased lines services is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of competitive trends, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Presence of strong economies of scale, scope and density in establishing access networks. Entry into the market through building own infrastructure requires significant levels of investment & large sunk costs.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Competition likely to be from self-supply of new fiber networks. While investment in alternative networks is increasing this is still limited. Implementation of 2020 remedies has prevented DSPs from engaging in anti-competitive behavior. These measures, however, need more time to fully reach their potential.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	As a key upstream input for competitors at the retail level, refusal to supply or discriminatory pricing could have immediate damaging consequences for access seekers. Ex post intervention is likely to be too slow to address these concerns effectively.

Exhibit 4.2.6: Wholesale trunk segments of Leased Lines: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-7 M11: Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination

Based on the findings of the 3CT, the market for wholesale mobile access and call origination is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of competitive trends, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Can only be provided by existing national MNOs and there are entry barriers to becoming a licensed MNO (e.g., spectrum licenses and network build).
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	Limits on competition in the retail mobile market indicates issues in the wholesale market.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	Ex post intervention is likely to be too slow to address these concerns effectively.

Exhibit 4.2.7: Wholesale mobile access and call origination: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-8 M12: Wholesale Mobile Termination

As per the insights from the 3CT, the market for wholesale mobile termination is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of competitive trends, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	Every mobile operator controls access to its subscribers via wholesale mobile termination. Unavoidable technical barriers to entry.
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	The market is a structural monopoly.
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	Ex post intervention is likely to be too slow to address these concerns effectively.

Exhibit 4.2.8: Wholesale mobile termination: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

4-2-9 M13: Wholesale MVNO Host Service

According to the results of the 3CT, the market for wholesale MVNO Host is susceptible to ex ante regulation. The existing entry barriers, lack of competitive trends, and the insufficiency of ex post interventions collectively indicate that without ex ante regulatory oversight, the market dynamics could favor Dominant Service Provider, to the detriment of overall market dynamics and consumer interests. Details of the analysis are as follows:

Criteria	Conclusion	Rationale
Entry barriers	Entry barriers are high	At the moment of the analysis, MVNO Host Services are only provided by existing national MNOs and there are entry barriers to becoming a licensed MNO (e.g., spectrum licenses and network build).
Market structure trend	No tendency towards competition	MVNOs rely on agreements with MNOs, which can exert a nuanced influence on them. Wholesale service prices are established in the agreements for a specified period and can rarely be adjusted for changes (e.g., seasonal promotions, etc.).
Sufficiency of ex post intervention	Ex post intervention not sufficient	Ex post intervention is likely to be too slow to address these concerns effectively.

Exhibit 4.2.9: Wholesale MVNO Host Services: susceptibility to ex ante regulation assessment

Competition Assessment

5. Competition Assessment

In assessing Service Providers within the telecommunications markets, CST employs a comprehensive approach that examines companies operating as part of a “single economic entity”. This approach considers Service Providers at a group level, treating the group, along with its affiliates and subsidiaries, as one unit. By doing so, CST can accurately determine the collective market influence of interconnected yet legally separate entities. CST acknowledges that subsidiaries, affiliates, and their respective parent companies may operate under different licensing regimes. However, for the purpose of evaluating market dominance, they are still considered a singular unit. This approach is essential for understanding the full scope of market dynamics and identifying dominant entities that may require regulatory intervention.

5-1 Retail markets

5-1-1 M1: Retail Fixed Access and Calls

5-1-1-1 Competition situation

Currently, STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go provide services for retail fixed access and calls.

Over the past three years, the market share distribution among these operators for retail fixed access has remained relatively stable. STC has maintained a dominant position in the market, holding a significantly high market share.

Furthermore, STC has control over essential facilities required for delivering fixed access services.

5-1-1-2 Competition potential

There are several key factors that limit competition potential in the market for retail fixed access and calls. Economies of scale, scope, and network density create significant barriers to entry, as well as the substantial sunk costs associated with developing a nationwide telephony access network.

STC, leveraging its national scale, offers bundled services across the entire KSA, utilizing its extensive access network and infrastructure. This advantage is not shared by other operators that are restricted by their more limited network reach.

Additionally, STC's pricing in this market has been regulated, preventing STC from setting excessively high prices for these services. Despite a shift from copper to fiber access among customers, STC's market share is expected to remain stable.

5-1-1-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST finds that STC holds a dominant position in the retail market for fixed access and calls.

5-1-2 M2: Retail Fixed Broadband Services

5-1-2-1 Competition situation

Retail broadband services are offered by STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go. Additionally, smaller ISPs also offer fixed broadband services by reselling broadband products acquired on the wholesale market. However, these smaller ISPs will not be considered for the competition assessment due to their small size relative to the other SPs, and their lack of control over infrastructure that can become a bottleneck for consumers.

Market share analysis of the SPs over the past three years shows that STC has maintained a significantly high market share. Recently, Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) has emerged as a strong competitor to fiber, primarily due to its lower pricing. In this context, Zain has been expanding its market presence significantly through its FWA offerings.

5-1-2-2 Competition potential

Open Access agreements aim to improve market competitiveness by mandating bitstream service sharing between Service Providers, but their impact will take time to unfold. This initiative targets the current challenges of economies of scale, network density, and the substantial investment needed for a nationwide network, which have historically limited competition.

While STC utilizes its extensive network to offer bundled services, alternative providers struggle due to limited network access and difficulties in securing wholesale broadband products. Wholesale access aims to lower these entry barriers, but international examples suggest that achieving a competitive retail market may take time.

Despite technological advancements, such as the shift from xDSL to fiber, the overall market share distribution is expected to remain largely unchanged. This suggests that although infrastructure improvements are being made, they do not directly address the competitive barriers alternative providers face in challenging STC's market dominance.

5-1-2-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST recognizes that STC holds a dominant position in the retail market for fixed broadband services.

5-1-3 M2.1: Retail FTTx Broadband Services

5-1-3-1 Competition situation

Retail FTTx services are offered by STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go. Smaller ISPs also offer FTTx broadband services but will be excluded from the analysis for the same reasons stated in the analysis of the retail fixed broadband services market.

Analysis of their market shares over the last three years indicates that STC's market share remains significantly high at the national level for FTTx services.

5-1-3-2 Competition potential

Open Access agreements are designed to tackle existing market challenges by requiring the provision of FTTx services. Similar to the broader broadband market, unlocking their full potential is expected to take time. This initiative addresses the high barriers to entry, such as strong economies of scale, scope, and network density, as well as the high sunk costs involved in deploying a nationwide FTTx network.

Alternative Service Providers, constrained by their limited network access, must secure wholesale broadband products. Wholesale access is intended to reduce these barriers; however, experiences from international markets indicate that transitioning to a competitive retail market could be a lengthy process. Currently, STC is expected to maintain its dominant position due to its extensive network reach.

5-1-3-3 Conclusion on Dominance

At the national level, STC is found to be dominant, in line with the Retail Broadband Market.

5-1-4 M3: Retail Leased Lines

5-1-4-1 Competition situation

Retail leased lines are provided by STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, Go, Layer 3 and various independent ISPs to both large businesses and government customers. Independent ISPs, due to their limited scale and lack of comprehensive network control, are not considered major competitors and are excluded from the study.

In the B2B segment, the competitive dynamics remain largely unchanged, being STC the dominant SP. The market structure and the presence of various SPs continue as before, without significant shifts.

The implementation of the Etimad platform has transitioned the awarding of B2G leased line contracts from a relationship-driven process, to a more structured, price-focused process. CST views the adoption of Etimad as a step towards fostering a competitive environment, enabling the Government to leverage competitive pricing for better contract terms. Despite this, at the time of writing this report, STC maintains a dominant position in the B2G market, with advantages in infrastructure, financial resources, connections, and economies of scale, which could enable it to offer lower prices.

5-1-4-2 Competition potential

In the B2B sector, the market dynamics are greatly influenced by existing infrastructure and economies of scale, with STC owning the fixed telephony network telephony. Alternative operators face challenges in terms of limited network reach and difficulties in securing effective wholesale leased line products.

The B2G segment presents even greater challenges, particularly due to the limited number of SPs in the market. In the sub-segment for other government agencies, the selection of only six SPs restricts market entry to those specific providers.

This limitation, highlighted in the 3CT analysis, underscores the significant barriers that other SPs face when attempting to enter the B2G market under the existing conditions.

5-1-4-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST finds that STC holds a dominant position in the retail market for leased lines, targeting both B2B and B2G segments.

5-2 Wholesale markets

5-2-1 M5: Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure

5-2-1-1 Competition situation

The wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market is governed by two fundamental regulations: interconnection regulations and regulations for access to physical facilities.

Interconnection Regulations: These regulations focus on ensuring fair and non-discriminatory treatment of all Service Providers in providing interconnection services. They include provisions for DSPs to promote competition, prevent abuses, and establish guidelines for remedies.

Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities: These regulations aim to promote the deployment of high-speed telecom networks by encouraging investment, expanding regional coverage, upgrading infrastructure for 5G, and streamlining installations. The regulations mandate transparency and fairness, requiring SPs to fairly process access requests to public network facilities and justify any rejections. Fees for accessing “vital” facilities are capped at cost-based rates to ensure fair competition. Disputes and agreement modifications are overseen by CST to ensure compliance and equitable access, as per Article 34 of the Act. Additionally, the regulations enforce for DSPs clear pricing and operational transparency through KPIs and review of ROs.

The competitive landscape in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market varies across different regions. Some Service Providers have a national presence, while others have a strong presence in specific areas. The diversity in service provision highlights the importance of regulatory oversight to ensure fair access and competition.

In this market, currently thirteen Service Providers supply wholesale local access and physical infrastructure services. These include retail and wholesale Service Providers such as STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go; infrastructure wholesalers such as Integrated Dawiyat, Lattice, Tawal, TLS, Center3, ACES; and carrier Service Providers such as Dawiyat and GCCIA. CST acknowledges that new licensees can be incorporated into the market in the future, and the market will be reassessed if market conditions change substantially, in accordance with the Designation of Markets and Dominance in Telecommunications Sector Regulation.

In the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure for fixed infrastructure backbones, Integrated Dawiyat utilizes its electricity transmission network infrastructure to integrate optical transmission technologies with fiber, enabling other Service Providers to offer their transmission services. Concurrently, STC, recognized as DSP in this market in the 2020 MDDD edition, is required to incorporate dark fiber services within its core and national access network into its RO. Furthermore, while STC is subject to ex ante remedies for the supply of LLU and VULA, inter-operator services remain significantly limited. Center3 owns all STC Data Centers and provides wholesale related services to other Service Providers.

On the other hand, in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure segment for mobile backbone network, STC and Tawal possess control over a high market share of the towers in the KSA. This significant control over tower infrastructure has the potential to create market imbalances.

5-2-1-2 Competition potential

In the wholesale access for fixed infrastructure backbone, the advantages of economies of scale, scope, and density make it challenging for new entrants to replicate networks like those of STC or Integrated Dawiyat. Control over essential facilities reduces investment costs and time for STC to expand its fiber network compared to new entrants.

Various SPs, including wholesalers and carrier SPs, are expanding their fiber networks across the KSA with the support of the Fiber Optic Delivery Regulations, improving service availability. However, alternatives to DSPs may not always be feasible, leading to practices like excessive pricing, refusal to supply, discrimination, and cross-subsidization in neighboring markets.

In the wholesale access for mobile infrastructure backbone, STC and Tawal are expected to continue expanding its network, supported by its financial power Other Service Providers or their affiliates are also expected to grow their networks, albeit at a slower pace.

CST acknowledges that the adoption and implementation of the Interconnection Regulations, along with the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities, will support alternative operators and increase the availability of wholesale products. However, it will take time for the market to become fragmented and truly competitive.

5-2-1-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST identifies STC, Tawal, Center3 and Integrated Dawiyat to be dominant at the national level in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market.

Additionally, based on regional analysis, CST has identified areas with a single network coverage (or effectively one network coverage). These areas can either be at a city level, or sub-city level such as industrial cities, residential compounds or even at building level. In these instances, CST reserves the right to declare any operator that exclusively owns a network as the dominant SP, as specified in the criteria of Appendix 7.3. .

5-2-2 M6: Wholesale Fixed Broadband Access Services

5-2-2-1 Competition situation

Through Open Access agreements, Service Providers can offer fiber optic services to end-users, regardless of infrastructure ownership. This initiative currently involves seven SPs including STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, TLS, Integrated Dawiyat, and Go, leveraging existing infrastructure to provide broadband services to over 3.5 million households across various regions in Saudi Arabia. The first phase of the Open Access initiative, launched by CST in 2020, focused on residential customers and aimed to promote competition, attract investment, and increase broadband subscriptions by improving service quality and consumer choice. In 2021, phase two of the Open Access initiative expanded to the business sector and was signed by STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, TLS, Integrated Dawiyat and Go. At the time of this report, ACES, which is licensed for service provision in this market, has signed Open Access agreements with Salam.

In the downstream retail broadband market, there has been a shift in the market share over the past three years; Zain, Salam, and Go have grown their market share, which is considered significant in 2023 when considering all three of them, while STC’s market share remains high. At the upstream level, the extensive national market presence of STC and Integrated Dawiyat may lead them to engage in dominant practices.th

In the 2020 MDDD edition, STC was the only SP designated dominant in this market and was subject to ex ante regulatory obligations at the national level.

5-2-2-2 Competition potential

New entrants face significant challenges in competing with established Service Providers due to high barriers and substantial fixed costs required for access network development. Established Service Providers benefit from economies of scale, scope, and density, making their networks difficult to replicate. For example, STC leverages its significant xDSL market share to transition customers to fiber, maintaining control over essential facilities. Vertical integration and presence across all relevant markets are crucial aspects of this market.

The fiber rollout under the Fiber Optic Delivery regulations is a potential source of increased competition. CST expects operators to expand their subscriber base by self-supplying Bitstream to offer retail services and by purchasing wholesale broadband from other operators. Wholesalers like Integrated Dawiyat are expected to benefit from this growth, and other Service Providers in the downstream market are likely to gain from their positions in specific areas.

5-2-2-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST has determined that STC and Integrated Dawiyat hold dominant positions at the national level within the wholesale fixed broadband access market.

Additionally, based on regional analysis, CST has identified areas with a single network coverage (or effectively one network coverage). These areas can either be at a city level, or sub-city level such as industrial cities or residential compounds. In these instances, CST reserves the right to declare any operator that exclusively owns a network as the dominant SP, as specified in the criteria of Appendix 7.3.

5-2-3 M7: Wholesale Transit Services

5-2-3-1 Competition situation

Currently, STC, Center3, Mobily, Zain, Salam, Integrated Dawiyat and Go provide wholesale transit services. STC holds a high market share in both domestic and international transit services.

5-2-3-2 Competition potential

In the wholesale transit services market, networks like STC's benefit from economies of scale, scope, and density. However, these advantages are not as pronounced in this market compared to others that require access network infrastructure.

STC is expected to maintain control over the fixed core network infrastructure. The introduction of other SPs through licensing is anticipated to enhance competition, but it will take more time to fully assess the impact on the market structure.

5-2-3-3 Conclusion on Dominance

STC is found to remain the DSP in the wholesale market for transit services.

5-2-4 M8: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination Services

5-2-4-1 Competition situation

Currently STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go offer wholesale fixed call termination services.

These operators have exclusive control over call termination on their networks, effectively giving them total control of this market segment on their infrastructure. Each Service Provider has exclusive access to and control over the key physical network infrastructure required to offer call termination services for calls that conclude on their network.

5-2-4-2 Competition potential

The market for wholesale fixed call termination services is inherently a structural monopoly, with no opportunity for new entrants or expansion by existing Service Providers. Technical barriers solidify the current market structure, preventing any shifts in competition dynamics.

5-2-4-3 Conclusion on Dominance

Operators that terminate calls on their own fixed networks are considered to have a controlling position in the market for wholesale fixed call termination on their respective networks.

Currently, CST determines this applies to STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go.

5-2-5 M9: Wholesale Terminating Segments of Leased Lines

5-2-5-1 Competition situation

Currently, seven Service Providers offer wholesale termination segments of leased lines: STC, Integrated Dawiyat, Mobily, Zain, Go, Salam and TLS. This competitive landscape highlights the variety of choices available in the market for these services.

However, STC stands out in the market, commanding a high market share in terms of revenue. This dominance is further reinforced by STC's ownership and control over the crucial infrastructure necessary for delivering the access segment of leased line services, positioning it as a key player in the market.

5-2-5-2 Competition potential

Regarding competition potential, STC distinguishes itself through its comprehensive control over access networks, establishing high barriers to entry and expansion for potential competitors. The significant fixed and sunk costs required to establish an access network make replicating STC's network a formidable challenge. These factors enhance STC's economies of scale, scope, and density, making it difficult for new entrants to compete on equal footing.

The market for substitute products is limited, with Integrated Dawiyat being a significant provider of alternative wholesale products. STC's RO includes essential services such as L2VPN and L3VPN for the terminating segment of leased lines, showcasing the options available in the market. Additionally, operators like Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go utilize their infrastructures to self-supply retail leased lines, further highlighting the competitive dynamics beyond STC.

5-2-5-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST concludes that STC holds a dominant position in the wholesale market for terminating segments of leased lines.
5-2-6 M10: Wholesale Trunk Segments of Leased Lines

5-2-6-1 Competition situation

Seven Service Providers - STC, Integrated Dawiyat, Mobily, Zain, Go, Salam and TLS - are currently active in offering wholesale trunk segments of leased lines. Even when considering self-supply by all operators, STC maintains a substantial revenue share.

5-2-6-2 Competition potential

STC's control over trunk networks creates high barriers for potential competitors due to significant investment and infrastructure development costs. This advantage, along with STC's economies of scale, scope, and density, makes it challenging for new entrants to compete.

Substitute product options are limited, with Integrated Dawiyat being the notable provider of alternative wholesale products. STC's RO and evidence of self-supply by operators like Mobily, Salam, and Go further illustrate the competitive landscape. However, the reach of their network deployment limits their ability to compete, as success in the trunk segment market requires owning infrastructure along critical routes.

5-2-6-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST recognizes that STC holds a dominant position in the wholesale market for the trunk segments of leased lines.

5-2-7 M11: Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination

5-2-7-1 Competition situation

STC, Mobily, and Zain are the current providers of wholesale mobile access and call origination services.

Market share analysis shows that STC maintains a high share strengthening its position relative to MNOs.

5-2-7-2 Competition potential

Currently, MNOs exert significant control over essential facilities in the mobile backbone infrastructure, creating high barriers to entry and expansion in this market. These barriers encompass the substantial and sunk fixed costs needed for infrastructure development and spectrum acquisition for new entrants.

The anticipated expansion of national roaming could potentially increase competition in the MACO market. While national roaming is currently restricted to rural areas under the universal service program, some national roaming agreements have been revised to encompass non-USF (Universal Service Fund) areas, typically on a reciprocal basis.

5-2-7-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST finds that STC holds a dominant position in the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination.

5-2-8 M12: Wholesale Mobile Termination Services

5-2-8-1 Competition situation

MNOs (STC, Zain, and Mobily) that provide mobile voice services at the retail level are capable of terminating voice calls on their mobile network, essentially holding complete market share for termination services on their network.

5-2-8-2 Competition potential

This market functions as a structural monopoly, with no space for new entrants or expansion due to technical barriers that prevents the current market structure from changing.

5-2-8-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST concludes that STC, Zain, and Mobily must continue being designated as Dominant Service Providers in this market.

5-2-9 M13: Wholesale MVNO Host Services.

5-2-9-1 Competition situation

In the KSA, all three MNOs (STC, Mobily and Zain) provide MVNO Host Services. Currently there are 4 MVNOs (Virgin Mobile, Lebara, Salam Mobile and Red Bull Mobile).

Virgin Mobile is the largest MVNO (in terms of subscribers) and is hosted on the STC network. Lebara is the second largest MVNO and is hosted on Mobily’s network. Salam Mobile and Red Bull Mobile are the third and fourth largest MVNOs (respectively) and are both hosted on Zain’s network.

MVNO Host Services can only be provisioned by licensed MNOs with an operational mobile network, which have control over essential infrastructure.

CST notes that certain issues can arise in the market due to the nature of agreements between MNOs and MVNOs, which can hinder the negotiation power of existing MVNOs. Switching hosts or moving from one MNO to another can be challenging for an MVNO, potentially involving high costs and service disruptions.

5-2-9-2 Competition potential

The full impact of MVNOs on the retail market has yet to be completely realized. Adjusting regulations for wholesale MVNO hosting services could significantly improve MVNOs' role and performance in the retail sector.

In the coming years, Mobile Virtual Network Enablers (MVNEs) and Mobile Virtual Network Aggregators (MVNAs) are expected to emerge in the MVNO Host services market.

MVNEs offer a comprehensive range of telecom services without the need for their own network infrastructure, making them good hosting services for virtual operators entering the telecom market, as they provide the technological backbone to MVNOs.

On the other hand, MVNAs provide wholesale mobile and data services to businesses that sell services to end users under their own brand. They connect smaller MVNOs to the MNO, streamlining operations. In this case, the MNOs own and operate the underlying network infrastructure.

Additionally, anticipated advancements in market dynamics and technology, such as IoT/M2M, 5G, and over-the-air provisioning, present opportunities for MVNOs to develop specialized and innovative retail services. These developments have the potential to substantially enhance their market position and contribution, narrowing the gap between MVNOs and MNOs further.

5-2-9-3 Conclusion on Dominance

CST determines that all MNOs (STC, Mobily, and Zain) offering MVNO Host service must be designated as Dominant Service Providers in the wholesale MVNO Host service market.

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[9] The fees charged for the provision of the wholesale service must be cost-based. This entails providing CST with the costs associated with each service included in the respective markets. The final price will include a markup, which must be agreed upon by CST in accordance with the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

Remedies

6. Remedies

6-1 Retail markets

6-1-1 M1: Retail Fixed Access and Fixed Calls

6-1-1-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in this market:

a. Price controls to put retail price control obligations by STC;

b. Cost studies by STC, subject to CST’s directions;

c. Technical and economic replicability test for bundles, prior to their launch.

d. Accounting separation;

e. Bundling allowed only subject to conditions.

6-1-1-2 Key market considerations

Section 5.1.1 outlines that STC is the DSP in the retail fixed access and fixed calls market. The key principles for regulating this market, emphasize the need for ex ante remedies in the market:

a. The effectiveness of remedies in upstream or adjacent markets significantly influences the need for retail market interventions. Successful regulation in wholesale markets has led to the reduction of retail market remedies in other jurisdictions, suggesting a phased relaxation approach without additional market analysis.

b. Cost-based price caps on the line rental tariffs may be sufficient to address any competition issues for this particular market, given the expected absence of competition for this type of services in the near future.

c. The competitive importance of service bundles, including both telecommunication and non-telecommunication services, underscores the necessity for strict accounting separation and cost management to prevent STC from exploiting its market dominance.

d. Retail market remedies often depend on the effectiveness of wholesale market regulations and may extend to adjacent retail markets. CST can impose obligations outside the direct market scope to address competition deficits, with the proper implementation of these obligations influencing the need for further remedies.

STC's regulatory ex ante and ex post obligations on non-discrimination of users for these retail services, which are based on other CST Statutes, are sufficient to address the risk of discrimination and do not therefore need to be duplicated through this MDDD Report.

6-1-1-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to the retail fixed access and fixed calls market remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Price controls: STC must be subject to retail price control obligations with regard to its retail tariffs in this market. These shall consist of an obligation to file such tariffs to CST and obtain its approval prior to their entry into effect. The procedure and conditions for the approval of such tariffs must be subject to CST Statutes in force regarding, in particular, tariff controls. In the case of this market, such tariff controls may consist, in particular, of cost-based caps based on available cost studies, benchmarking or any other mechanisms available.

 Imposing retail price control obligations on STC for its retail tariffs in the fixed access and calls market ensures consumer protection against unfair pricing.

 The adoption of cost-based caps derived from cost studies or benchmarking, ensures STC's prices reflect actual service costs.

b. Cost studies by STC, subject to CST’s directions.

 Mandating STC to conduct cost studies under CST's guidance ensures pricing transparency and accuracy. This requirement guarantees that STC's tariffs are based on actual costs.

c. Technical and economic replicability test for bundles, prior to their launch.

 Implementing a technical and economic replicability test for bundles prior to their launch ensures that STC has reviewed that new packages are competitively priced and technically feasible for other SPs.

d. Accounting separation: STC must prepare and submit to CST accounting information on this, among other markets, as further required under the Accounting Separation Regulations and the accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, as these may be amended from time to time.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across retail fixed access and fixed calls and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

e. Bundling allowed only subject to conditions: STC may not bundle any tariffs for mobility, retail line installation/rental or retail fixed calls with any other services (other than fixed broadband) or products (also including non-telecommunications services or products) prior to CST’s satisfaction that STC has fully complied with its obligations under (a, b, c, and d) above.

 Conditionally allowing STC to bundle tariffs for retail line installation/rental or retail fixed calls ensures compliance with prior obligations, promoting transparency and fairness in bundling practices.

6-1-2 M2: Retail Fixed Broadband Services

6-1-2-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in this market:

a. Price controls to put retail price control obligations by STC;

b. Cost studies by STC, subject to CST’s directions;

c. Technical and economic replicability test for bundles, prior to their launch.

d. Accounting separation;

e. Bundling allowed only subject to conditions.

6-1-2-2 Key market considerations

The key issues in this market are similar to those discussed in the previous section. This applies especially to the importance of remedies in upstream or neighboring markets, as a tool required to ensure that STC does not engage in excessive, or discriminatory prices in this market, or in anti-competitive bundling. In particular, the need for remedies in the retail fixed broadband market will strongly depend on the adoption and effective implementation (which may take time) of any remedies and other DSP obligations on the upstream wholesale fixed broadband market.

6-1-2-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to the retail fixed broadband market remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Price controls: STC must be subject to retail price control obligations with regard to its retail tariffs in this market. These shall consist of an obligation to file such tariffs to CST and obtain its approval prior to their entry into effect. The procedure and the conditions for the approval of such tariffs shall be subject to CST Statutes in force regarding, in particular, tariff controls. CST may of course limit this obligation to specified offers, depending on the progress of implementation of STC's other obligations in this and upstream markets, and the evolving conditions of competition.

 Imposing retail price control obligations on STC for its retail fixed broadband services ensures protection for consumers against unfair pricing. Requiring CST approval for tariffs before they become effective, as mandated by CST statutes, enhances transparency and fairness in pricing within the broadband market.

 The application of cost-based caps on broadband tariffs, determined through cost studies, CST directions or benchmarking, guarantees that STC's pricing accurately reflects the cost of service provision.

 Furthermore, ensuring that STC's broadband service fees are cost-oriented, supported by detailed cost analyses and benchmarks, assures that prices are fair and proportionate to the costs of service delivery.

b. Cost studies by STC, subject to CST's directions.

 Mandating STC to conduct cost studies under CST's guidance ensures pricing transparency and accuracy. This requirement guarantees that STC's tariffs are based on actual costs, promoting fairness in pricing practices and fostering a competitive environment that benefits consumers and encourages market efficiency.

c. Technical and economic replicability test for bundles, prior to their launch.

 Implementing a technical and economic replicability test for bundles prior to their launch ensures that new packages for the retail fixed broadband market are competitively priced and technically feasible.

d. Accounting separation: STC must prepare and submit to CST accounting information on the retail fixed broadband market, among other, markets, as further required under the Accounting Separation Regulations and the accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, as these may be amended from time to time.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across regulated retail fixed broadband market products and unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

e. Bundling allowed only subject to conditions: STC may not bundle any tariffs for retail fixed broadband access with any other services (other than fixed voice calls) or products (also including non-telecommunications services or products) prior to CST's satisfaction that STC has fully complied with its obligations under this MDDD Report with regard to its obligations under (a, b, c, and d) above.

 Conditionally allowing STC to bundle tariffs for retail fixed broadband products ensures compliance with prior obligations, promoting transparency and fairness in bundling practices.

6-1-3 M2.1: Retail FTTx Broadband Services

6-1-3-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, remedies for the retail fixed broadband services market were applicable to the FTTx sub-market.

6-1-3-2 Key market considerations

Retail FTTx services are offered by STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam, and Go. CST’s analysis identified that STC is found to be dominant, in line with the Retail Broadband Market

6-1-3-3 Remedies and rationale

a. Price controls: STC must be subject to retail price control obligations with regard to its retail tariffs in this market. These shall consist of an obligation to file such tariffs to CST and obtain its approval prior to their entry into effect. The procedure and the conditions for the approval of such tariffs shall be subject to CST Statutes in force regarding, in particular, tariff controls. CST may of course limit this obligation to specified offers, depending on the progress of implementation of DSP's other obligations in this and upstream markets, and the evolving conditions of competition.

 Applying retail price control obligations on STC for its retail tariffs in the FTTx broadband services market is critical for safeguarding consumers from unfair pricing. These controls necessitate CST's pre-implementation approval, anchored in CST statutes, to enhance pricing transparency and equity.

 The institution of cost-based caps on FTTx service tariffs, informed by cost studies, or benchmarking, guarantees that STC’s pricing mirrors the genuine costs of service provision.

b. Cost studies by STC, subject to CST's directions.

c. Technical and economic replicability test for bundles, prior to their launch.

 Implementing a technical and economic replicability test for bundles prior to their launch ensures that FTTx new packages are competitively priced and technically feasible.

d. Accounting separation: STC must prepare and submit to CST accounting information on this, among other, markets, as further required under the Accounting Separation Regulations and the accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, as these may be amended from time to time.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across regulated FTTx products and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

e. Bundling allowed only subject to conditions: DSP may not bundle any tariffs for retail fixed broadband access with any other services (other than fixed voice calls) or products (also including non-telecommunications services or products) prior to CST's satisfaction that DSP has fully complied with its obligations under this MDDD Report with regard to its obligations under (a, b, c, d and e) above.

 Permitting STC to bundle tariffs for retail FTTx broadband services under strict conditions ensures adherence to existing obligations, fostering transparency and fairness in bundling strategies.

6-1-4 M3: Retail Leased Lines

6-1-4-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in the (equivalent) market for retail leased lines in the B2B and the B2G segments:

a. Price controls to put retail price control obligations by STC;

b. Cost studies by STC, subject to CST’s directions;

c. Technical and economic replicability test for bundles, prior to their launch.

d. Accounting separation;

e. Bundling allowed only subject to conditions.

6-1-4-2 Key market considerations

The market remains predominantly led by STC in both the B2B and the B2G segments, though there are now increased competitive dynamics in the B2G due to the Etimad Platform in the B2G segment.

In the absence of remedies in this market, the DSP possesses both the capability and motivation to engage in practices such as excessive pricing, refusal to supply, undue discrimination, anti-competitive bundling, and cross-subsidization of other services.

6-1-4-3 Remedies and rationale

CST holds the authority to apply the discussed remedies distinctively across the two identified market segments, acknowledging their unique dynamics. Additionally, given the Etimad platform's influence on the B2G segment dynamics, CST reserves the right to independently review this segment at any point during the MDDD report's application period.

a. Price controls: STC must submit all proposed new retail tariffs or retail tariff amendments for retail leased lines to CST for its approval, prior to putting them into effect.

 Ensuring retail price control obligations on STC for retail leased lines protect consumers from unfair pricing, with CST's pre-approval ensuring pricing transparency and fairness according to CST statutes.

 Cost-based caps on leased line tariffs, informed by cost studies and benchmarking, ensure STC's prices mirror actual costs, promoting competition and enabling new market entrants.

b. Cost studies by STC, subject to CST’s directions.

 Mandating STC to conduct cost studies for retail lease lines products under CST's guidance ensures pricing transparency and accuracy. This requirement guarantees that STC's tariffs are based on actual costs, promoting fairness in pricing practices and fostering a competitive environment that benefits consumers and encourages market efficiency.

c. Technical and economic replicability test for bundles, prior to their launch.

 Implementing a technical and economic replicability test for bundles for retail leased lines prior to their launch ensures that STC’s new packages are competitively priced and technically feasible.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across regulated retail leased lines products and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

e. Bundling allowed only subject to conditions: STC may not bundle any tariffs for retail leased lines with any other services or products (also including non-telecommunications services or products), whether in the consumer or in the business segment, prior to CST’s satisfaction that STC has fully complied with its obligations under this MDDD Report with regard to (a, b, c, and d) above.

 Conditionally permitting STC to bundle tariffs for retail leased lines ensures adherence to regulatory obligations, enhancing transparency and fairness in bundling.

6-2 Wholesale markets

6-2-1 M5: Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure

6-2-1-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is currently subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in this market:

a. Obligation to offer the following services/access in this market:

i. Wholesale (physical) local loop copper access including unbundled local loop and sub loop unbundling;

ii. Virtual unbundling (VULA), similar in functionality to physical local loop unbundling.

iii. Access to passive network infrastructure in the local fixed access network, for the purposes of providing physical local access services, including access to all relevant facilities/services and collocation space (duct and cable vaults access, dark fiber, cable landing points, and collocation in buildings and sites).

b. Non-discrimination;

c. Transmission of any STC agreements on physical local fixed access services to CST;

d. Cost orientation of fees for STC wholesale services in this market;

e. Preparation and publication of a reference offer, which must be subject to CST's approval and include the provision of the of wholesale services falling under those defined above; and

f. Accounting separation.

Additionally, the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities include:

g. Unbundling of services: DSPs are prohibited from bundling access to physical facilities with separate interconnection services that are not requested by the Access Seeker.

h. Amendments to existing services: Any significant changes to the setup of existing services by DSPs must be agreed upon with the Access Seeker, and the notice period shall be at least 60 days.

Furthermore, these regulations provide detailed elaboration on the content of the ex ante remedies regarding non-discrimination, transparency (including the Reference Offer), and pricing.

6-2-1-2 Key market considerations

Following the enactment of the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities, transparency in wholesale local access and physical infrastructure markets has significantly improved. The 2020 MDDD edition identified STC as the sole Service Provider in the market subjected to ex ante obligations. These obligations have been intensified with the publication of the RO, although they have not extended to the concept of a single economic entity as it is the case in this current edition. Contrary to STC, Integrated Dawiyat, another prominent SP in the market, has not yet been subjected to ex ante obligations. Similarly, at the regional level, no SP has not been subject to ex ante obligations.

CST anticipates that the increased application of the Fiber Optic Delivery Regulations, Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities, will progressively enhance the availability of wholesale local access and physical infrastructure services. These services, provided by a diverse range of operators including wholesalers and carriers, are expected to experience regional growth. Such local expansion highlights the necessity for establishing ex ante regulation at the regional level. Furthermore, at the sub-city level, such as in specific industrial cities or residential compounds, CST acknowledges the existence of areas served by only one network. In these instances, CST reserves the right to declare any operator that exclusively owns a network as the dominant SP, aligned with the criteria of Appendix 7.3.

6-2-1-3 Remedies and rationale

CST finds STC, Tawal, Center3 and Integrated Dawiyat to be dominant at the national level in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market. CST reserves the right to declare any operator that exclusively owns a network as the dominant SP at the sub-city level aligned with the criteria of Appendix 7.3. The remedies previously applied to this market remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Provision of access services to the physical infrastructure: DSPs must provide, upon reasonable request by any Service Provider with a right to interconnect to a public telecommunications network in the Kingdom, the following services:

i. Wholesale (physical) local loop copper access including unbundled local loop and sub loop unbundling;

ii. Virtual unbundling (VULA), similar in functionality to physical local loop unbundling.

iii. Access to masts and towers, for the purpose of co-location of equipment and infrastructure sharing to provide local access services.:

iv. Access to dark fiber networks, for the purpose of collocation of equipment and infrastructure sharing to provide local access services.

v. Access to passive network infrastructure in the local mobile and fixed access network, for the purposes of providing physical local access services, including access to all relevant facilities/services, collocation space (duct and cable vaults access, cable landing points, and collocation in buildings and sites), infrastructure sharing, IBS access to mobile network infrastructure such as Distributed Antenna Systems (DAS), Cable Landing Stations, Dark Fiber Access, Data Center Services, and Metro Connect Service, among others

DSPs must provide justification and proof that a request by a Service Provider for any of the above services is unreasonable if the DSP claims this to be the case.

Details of the provision of these services must be in line with the relevant provisions of the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 The provision of access obligation is considered crucial and appropriate because of the significant market power DSPs possess in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure markets. Therefore, imposing an obligation on DSPs to grant network access upon reasonable request is essential for fostering competition in downstream markets. In the absence of such an obligation, DSPs could potentially deny access or impose less favorable terms to their advantage, undermining downstream competition and adversely affecting consumer interests.

 The provision of access obligation encompasses a requirement for DSPs to offer any ancillary services necessary to enable effective network access. It is acknowledged that certain ancillary services, such as site accommodation and interconnection facilities, play a vital role across various fixed telecom markets. To support transparency, DSPs are expected to clearly indicate available ancillary services within each market through their product listings, including those applicable across multiple markets.

b. Non-discrimination: DSPs must provide the above wholesale services without discrimination between different Service Providers or between other Service Providers and the DSPs’ own affiliates or downstream operations.

 The rationale and decisions highlight the critical importance of ensuring non-discrimination by DSPs when supplying access services. It is vital for DSPs to offer access services to themselves, downstream divisions, and other telecom providers under identical terms to maintain a level competitive field.

 Without such equality, DSPs could engage in practices detrimental to downstream competition and consumer interests, potentially discouraging the deployment of alternative networks and negatively impacting consumer outcomes.

c. Transmission of any DSP agreements on physical local fixed access services to CST: DSPs must forward to CST, for its review and approval, any interconnection agreement it concludes for the provision of wholesale local access and physical infrastructure, as further provided under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 The review of these agreements equips CST with the necessary information to effectively regulate the market, ensuring that the provision of wholesale local access and physical infrastructure services complies with regulatory standards and objectives.

 It reinforces and ensures the compliance of DSPs with existing telecommunications regulations, including the Interconnection Regulations and Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 It helps to build confidence among stakeholders, including investors, competitors, and consumers, that the telecommunications market operates fairly and is conducive to growth and innovation.

d. Cost orientation of fees: The fees charged by the DSPs for the provision of the wholesale physical local fixed access services defined above (subsection a), must be cost-based, as further determined under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 A fair and reasonable charging requirement ensures that service access remains available to all market participants, maintaining investment incentives and protecting retail competition. With the expectation of increased competition, such a policy will restrain the DSP's ability to raise prices unjustly, ensuring that the charges remain fair and reasonable while supporting the competitive landscape's evolution.

e. Publication of a reference offer: All DSPs in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market must prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), which must be subject to CST's approval and include the provision of the of wholesale services defined above (subsection a). The content of the RO, and the procedure for its preparation and approval must comply with the provisions of the Interconnection Regulations, and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities. DSPs’ Reference Offer for access to its relevant physical facilities must be fully compliant with its obligations under other applicable CST statutes.

 The publication of an RO is pivotal for ensuring transparency within the telecommunications market. It aids in the monitoring of potential anti-competitive behaviors by providing a clear and public reference point for the terms and conditions under which wholesale services are offered.

 By detailing the terms and conditions for purchasing wholesale services, an RO gives visibility to other providers. This is crucial for promoting stability within the market, expediting negotiations, reducing the likelihood of disputes, and bolstering confidence among providers seeking to purchase wholesale services on fair and non-discriminatory terms.

On the grounds of proportionality, the following obligation is imposed on STC only:

f. Accounting separation: STC must prepare and submit to CST accounting information on this, among other, markets, as further required under the Accounting Separation Regulations and the accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, as these may be amended from time to time.

 Imposing an accounting separation obligation on STC in the wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market is crucial for monitoring the effectiveness of regulatory measures and ensuring non-discriminatory practices.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across this market and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

g. Unbundling of services: DSPs are prohibited from bundling access to physical facilities with separate interconnection services that are not requested by the Access Seeker.

 The prohibition on DSPs from bundling access to physical facilities with unrequested interconnection services ensures access seekers only pay for services they require. This rule promotes fair competition and prevents DSPs from imposing unnecessary costs on access seekers, fostering a more equitable market environment.

 By mandating the unbundling of services, CST aims to enhance market transparency and choice for access seekers. This approach discourages anti-competitive practices, allowing access seekers to tailor their service packages according to their specific needs and preferences, ultimately benefiting consumers.

h. Amendments to existing services: Any significant changes to the setup of existing services by DSPs must be agreed upon with the Access Seeker, and the notice period shall be at least 60 days.

 The mandate for DSPs to obtain agreement from Access Seekers before implementing significant changes to service setups, with at least 60 days' notice, ensures transparency and cooperation. This requirement facilitates planning and adjustments by Access Seekers, enhancing market stability and predictability.

6-2-2 M6: Wholesale Broadband Access

6-2-2-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is currently subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in this market:

a. Obligation to offer the following services/access in this market:

i. “Current generation” (copper-based) and, as of a date to be defined by decision of CST, “next generation” (fiber-based) bitstream services that may be used to provide broadband and/or voice services;

ii. Access to infrastructure in the local fixed access network, for the purposes of providing bitstream services;

b. Non-discrimination;

c. Transmission of any STC agreements on wholesale fixed broadband access services to CST;

d. Cost orientation of fees;

e. Preparation and publication of a reference offer, which should include price and non-price related terms and conditions for the provision of all wholesale services mentioned above (subsection a), and should be subject to CST’s review and approval; and

f. Accounting separation.

Additionally, the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities include:

g. Unbundling of services: DSPs are prohibited from bundling access to physical facilities with separate interconnection services that are not requested by the Access Seeker.

h. Amendments to existing services: Any significant changes to the setup of existing services by DSPs must be agreed upon with the Access Seeker, and the notice period shall be at least 60 days.

6-2-2-2 Key market considerations

The Open Access measures, encompassing all fixed operators with FTTx networks, were designed to broaden the scope of wholesale broadband access services, offered by both alternative operators and wholesalers. While the full impact of these initiatives is still unfolding, early indicators suggest that the market is moving in the right direction, albeit gradually. Currently, DSPs in various areas, that own the infrastructure, continue to dominate. CST recognizes the importance of these developments and plans to closely observe the ongoing effects in regions serviced by DSPs, acknowledging that meaningful change often requires time to fully manifest.

CST anticipates that the increased application of the Fiber Optic Delivery Regulations, Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities, will progressively enhance the availability of wholesale broadband access products. These services, provided by a diverse range of operators including wholesalers and carriers, are expected to experience regional growth. Such local expansion highlights the necessity for establishing ex ante regulation at the regional level. Furthermore, at the sub-city level, such as in specific industrial cities or residential compounds, CST acknowledges the existence of areas served by only one network. In these instances, CST reserves the right to declare any operator that exclusively owns a network as the dominant SP, aligned with the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.3. These remedies are designed to mitigate risks such as excessive pricing, refusal to supply, undue discrimination, and the cross-subsidization of other services in these areas, impacting interrelated neighboring markets.

6-2-2-3 Remedies and rationale

CST finds STC and Integrated Dawiyat to be dominant at the national level in the wholesale broadband access market. CST reserves the right to declare any operator that exclusively owns a network as the dominant SP at the sub-city level, aligned with the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.3. The remedies previously applied to this market remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Provision of wholesale fixed broadband access services: DSPs are required to offer the following services upon a reasonable request by any Service Provider entitled to interconnect to a public telecommunications network in the Kingdom:

i. Wholesale Bitstream Access Service, delivered by the Access Provider, featuring a strand of optical fiber of the required length.

ii. Wholesale Bitstream Fiber to the Home (FTTH), provided by the Access Provider, involving a strand of optical fiber of the necessary length for FTTH service.

iii. Wholesale Bitstream Fiber to the Business (FTTB), offered by the Access Provider, with a strand of optical fiber of the required length for FTTB service.

iv. Access to infrastructure in the local fixed access network, for the purposes of providing bitstream services, including access to all associated facilities/services, collocation space and infrastructure sharing.

DSPs must provide justification and proof that a request by a SP for any of the above services is unreasonable if the DSPs claim this to be the case.

Details of the provision of these services must be in line with the relevant provisions of the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 The obligation for DSPs to provide comprehensive wholesale broadband access services is fundamental to addressing the disparities in market power. Recognizing the significant capital and time required for new entrants to develop comparable broadband infrastructure, this obligation mitigates substantial entry barriers.

 DSPs are thus expected to transparently disclose available ancillary services, facilitating a clear understanding of the resources at their disposal. This transparency is vital for eliminating ambiguities and streamlining the process of accessing and utilizing network services, thereby enhancing market accessibility and competitiveness.

 By imposing clear, enforceable access obligations on DSPs, the regulation not only promotes fair competition but also safeguards consumer interests.

b. Non-discrimination: DSPs must provide the above wholesale services without discrimination between different SPs or between other Service Providers and DSPs’ own affiliates or downstream operations.

 This regulation prevents favoritism, fostering a competitive environment, broadening consumer choices, and controlling costs. It is vital for promoting a diverse and competitive broadband market, benefiting both providers and consumers.

c. Transmission of any DSP agreements on wholesale fixed broadband access services to CST: DSPs must forward to CST, for its review and approval, any agreement it concludes for the provision of wholesale fixed broadband access services, as further provided under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 This process provides CST with essential insights to effectively oversee the broadband market, ensuring that the services offered adhere to established regulations and objectives.

 It is crucial for enhancing stakeholder confidence in the wholesale broadband market, showcasing a commitment to fairness and regulatory compliance, thus reassuring investors, competing SPs, and consumers about the market's integrity and support for equitable growth and innovation.

d. Cost orientation of fees: The fees charged by the DSPs for the provision of the wholesale broadband services defined above (subsection a), must be cost-based, as further determined under the Interconnection Regulations, and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 This policy ensures that DSPs' charges for wholesale broadband access are fair and prevent price squeezes, thereby encouraging competition and investment from both access seekers and competing network operators. It supports the development of alternative networks and market dynamism.

 The requirement for fair and reasonable charges ensures access for all market participants, preserving investment incentives and protecting retail competition. It limits DSPs' ability to unjustly increase prices, maintaining a fair and competitive market environment.

e. Publication of a reference offer: DSPs must prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), which must be subject to CST’s approval and include the provision of the wholesale services defined above (subsection a) and must include ancillary services. The content of the RO, and the procedure for its preparation and approval must comply with the provisions of the Interconnection Regulations and Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 The publication of an RO ensures transparency within the telecommunications market. It aids in the monitoring of potential anti-competitive behaviors by providing a clear and public reference point for the terms and conditions under which wholesale services are offered.

On the grounds of proportionality, the following obligation is imposed on STC only:

 Imposing an accounting separation obligation on STC in the wholesale broadband access market is crucial for monitoring the effectiveness of regulatory measures and ensuring non-discriminatory practices.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across this market and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

g. Unbundling of services: DSPs are prohibited from bundling wholesale broadband access services with separate interconnection services that are not requested by the Access Seeker.

 The prohibition on DSPs from bundling wholesale broadband access services with unrequested interconnection services ensures access seekers only pay for services they require. This rule promotes fair competition and prevents DSPs from imposing unnecessary costs on access seekers, fostering a more equitable market environment.

h. Amendments to existing services: Any significant changes to the setup of existing services by DSPs must be agreed upon with the Access Seeker, and the notice period shall be at least 60 days.

6-2-3 M7: Wholesale Transit Services

6-2-3-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in this market:

a. Obligation to offer wholesale transit service and access to all licensed Service Providers;

b. Non-discrimination to all Service Providers even its own affiliates;

c. Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST;

d. Cost orientation of transit fees;

e. Preparation and publication of a reference offer, which should include wholesale transit interconnection services; and

f. Accounting separation.

6-2-3-2 Key market considerations

The 2020 MDDD edition acknowledged that the gradual rollout of alternative fixed infrastructures is not expected to change the leading position held by STC and Center3. By 2024, STC and Center3 have seen a decrease in its market share, yet its position in transit services remains prominent. The enforcement of the remedies is justified to prevent STC's ability and incentive to engage in excessive pricing, refusal to supply transit services, and/or discrimination.

6-2-3-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to the wholesale transit services market remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Provision of wholesale transit services: STC and Center3 are required to provide wholesale transit services for national and international traffic originating in the KSA, up to and including gateways, upon a reasonable request by any Service Provider entitled to interconnect to a public telecommunications network in the Kingdom. STC and Center3 bears the burden of having to demonstrate, with proof, that a Service Provider's request for wholesale transit services is unreasonable.

 Obligating STC and Center3 to provide wholesale transit services upon reasonable requests is critical for promoting competition and preventing the potential for access denial or imposition of unfavorable terms that could harm competition and consumer interests.

 This policy underscores a commitment to maintaining an open and competitive wholesale transit services market by imposing clear access obligations on STC and Center3, fostering fair competition, and benefiting consumers.

b. Non-discrimination: STC and Center3 are obligated to offer wholesale transit services equitably, without discrimination among different Service Providers or between other Service Providers and STC’s own affiliates (Center3) or downstream operations.

 It is essential for STC and its affiliate Center3 to supply access services on equal terms to all, including their own operations and other telecom providers, to ensure a competitive market.

 Failing to maintain equality could harm downstream competition, discourage alternative network deployment, and negatively affect consumer outcomes.

c. Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST: STC and Center3 must forward to CST, for its review and approval, a copy of any interconnection agreement it concludes regarding the provision of wholesale transit services.

 The review of these agreements equips CST with the necessary information to effectively regulate the market, ensuring that the provision of the wholesale transit agreement complies with regulatory standards and objectives.

d. Cost orientation of fees: The fees that STC and Center3 charge for providing the defined wholesale transit services must be based on costs.

 A fair charging policy prevents price squeezes and promotes competition, encouraging investment from access seekers and competing operators, thereby aiding the development of alternative networks and market competition.

 Ensuring fair and reasonable charges, limits STC’s and Center3’s ability to unfairly increase prices and supporting a competitive market environment.

e. Publication of a reference offer: STC and Center3 are required to prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), subject to CST's approval. This RO must detail the provision of the wholesale transit services as defined previously. The content and preparation procedure of the RO must adhere to the standards.

 The publication of an RO is essential for ensuring transparency within the wholesale transit market. It aids in the monitoring of potential anti-competitive behaviors by providing a clear and public reference point for the terms and conditions under which wholesale transit services are offered.

 It promotes stability within the wholesale transit market, expediting negotiations, reducing the likelihood of disputes, and bolstering confidence among SPs seeking to purchase wholesale transit services on fair and non-discriminatory terms.

f. Accounting separation: STC and Center3 are to provide CST with accounting information for the wholesale transit market (among other markets), as required under the Accounting Separation Regulations and its accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, which may be amended periodically.

 Imposing an accounting separation obligation on STC and Center3 in the wholesale transit market is essential for monitoring the effectiveness of regulatory measures and ensuring non-discriminatory practices. This transparency allows stakeholders to verify STC and Center3 compliance with market regulations, fostering competition and aiding regulatory oversight.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across transit services and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

6-2-4 M8: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination

6-2-4-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go are subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of their designation as dominant in this market:

a. Provision of wholesale fixed call termination services by any Service Provider on a non-discriminatory basis;

b. Non-discrimination to treat all Service Providers equally, even affiliated companies.

c. Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST for review and approval, as per the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

d. Cost orientation of termination fees, to be determined by cost on benchmarking studies

e. For STC only: preparation and publication of a reference offer, which should include the following services:

i. Call termination to geographic numbers;

ii. Call termination to directory enquiries;

iii. Call termination to emergency services;

iv. Call termination to non-geographic numbers;

f. For other DSPs other than STC, prohibition to charge higher fees for wholesale fixed termination services other than those charged by STC.

g. For STC only: Accounting separation

6-2-4-2 Key market considerations

STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go have been identified as DSPs in call termination within their networks due to a structural monopoly. To prevent these SPs from engaging in excessive pricing, refusing to supply termination services, and practicing undue discrimination, ex ante remedies will be implemented. Certain ex ante remedies will be exclusively imposed on STC.

6-2-4-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to this market remain valid and will continue to be upheld. The following remedies are imposed on all Service Providers that terminate calls on their own fixed network and so are found to be dominant in this market:

a. Provision of wholesale fixed call termination services: STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go are required to provide fixed call termination services and associated access facilities upon reasonable request by any Service Provider with the right to interconnect to a public telecommunications network in the Kingdom. These DSPs must demonstrate, with proof, that a Service Provider's request for such services is unreasonable, if claimed.

Termination services must be provided for the following numbers and services:

i. Geographic numbers

ii. Directory enquiries

iii. Emergency services, and

iv. Non-geographic numbers.

STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go must also provide interconnection links and collocation space for the interconnected Service Providers' equipment.

 This aims to foster a competitive environment where all Service Providers can utilize termination services, thereby enhancing consumer choice and service quality.

b. Non-discrimination: STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go are required to provide fixed call termination services without discrimination between different Service Providers or between other Service Providers and their own affiliates or downstream operations.

 This approach prevents them from engaging in practices that could favor their own operations or affiliates, ensuring that all players, including smaller or emerging entities, can compete on equal conditions.

c. Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST: STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go must forward to CST a copy of any interconnection agreement concluded for the provision of fixed call termination services, as specified under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 Submitting agreements to CST for review highlights regulatory compliance and market fairness, ensuring they meet industry standards. This boosts confidence in the market.

d. Cost orientation of termination fees: The fees charged by STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go for the provision of the wholesale fixed call termination services defined above (subsection a), must be cost-based as determined under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 By tying fees to the actual costs of providing services, the regulation curtails the potential for exploitative pricing, encouraging a more dynamic market where investment and innovation can thrive.

On the grounds of proportionality, the following obligations are imposed on STC only:

e. Publication of a reference offer: STC must prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), subject to CST's approval, which includes the provision of the wholesale fixed call termination services. The content and preparation procedure of the RO must adhere to the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 It enhances transparency, offering a clear outline of service terms. This visibility is vital for enabling fair access, preventing anti-competitive behavior, and ensuring that all providers can navigate the market with confidence.

f. Accounting separation: STC is required to prepare and submit to CST accounting information for this and other markets, as mandated under the Accounting Separation Regulations and its Guidelines and Rules, which may be amended over time.

 It ensures that STC’s financial reporting is transparent, and that costs and revenues are accurately allocated in the wholesale calls terminating market, preventing cross-subsidization that could distort the market.

The following obligation is imposed only on Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go (DSPs in this market other than STC):

g. Prohibition to charge higher fees for wholesale fixed termination services: Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go are prohibited from charging higher fees for wholesale fixed termination services than those charged by STC for similar or equivalent services, unless they can demonstrate to CST's satisfaction that such higher fees are justified by objective reasons, particularly related to the DSP's efficient costs.

 This measure enhances market fairness, preventing undue pricing advantages and encouraging efficient cost management among providers.

6-2-5 M9: Wholesale Access to Terminating Segments of Leased Lines

6-2-5-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is currently subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in the market for the terminating segments of wholesale leased lines services and managed network transmission services:

a. Requirement to offer access to terminating (and trunk) segments of wholesale leased lines, managed network transmission services and all relevant ancillary facilities/services and collocation space, on a non-discriminatory basis.

b. Non-discrimination;

c. Preparation and publication of a reference offer, subject to review and approval by CST.

d. Cost-based charges for wholesale access services in this market; and

e. Accounting separation.

6-2-5-2 Key market considerations

Since the 2020 MDDD edition, there has been an increase in the presence of other Service Providers, including wholesalers as Integrated Dawiyat, in the market for the wholesale access of the terminating segment of leased lines. Despite this, STC continues to hold a significant market share, with its self-supply remaining the largest purchaser.

In this context, maintaining the existing ex ante remedies imposed on STC seems reasonable. Such measures are necessary to mitigate the risks of excessive pricing, refusal to supply (both in general and specifically in terms of Ethernet), and discrimination. Furthermore, there is a concern that insufficient regulatory oversight of its pricing policy could enable STC to leverage its position. This advantage could be used to subsidize and enhance its already strong or dominant position in neighboring markets or market segments.

6-2-5-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to the wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Provision of wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines services: Upon reasonable request, STC must provide the following wholesale leased lines services to any Service Provider licensed to operate a public telecommunications network in the Kingdom:

i. Access to (terminating) segments of leased lines, with an obligation to make Ethernet leased lines available.

ii. Access to all relevant ancillary facilities/services and collocation space.

STC must demonstrate, with proof, that a Service Provider's request of any of the above services is unreasonable, if STC claims this to be the case.

 This ensures fair competition by allowing Service Providers access to critical infrastructure, preventing STC from unfairly restricting access or imposing unreasonable terms that could harm the competitive landscape.

 This supports a competitive environment by facilitating access to essential services for all telecom providers.

 This transparency and flexibility in accessing services are crucial for maintaining an equitable market, promoting innovation, and benefiting consumers.

b. Non-discrimination: STC must provide the above services without discrimination between different Service Providers or between other Service Providers and STC’s own affiliates or downstream operations.

 Ensuring non-discrimination in offering wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines is crucial to maintain market fairness, requiring DSPs to uniformly treat all telecom providers, including their own affiliates.

 The absence of such equity risks undermining competition and consumer choice, potentially stalling the growth of alternative networks and degrading service quality.

c. Publication of a reference offer: STC must prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), which must be subject to CST’s approval and set out the terms and conditions for the provision of the services defined above (subsection a). The content of the RO, and the procedure for its preparation and approval must comply with the provisions of the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 Publishing a Reference Offer (RO) for wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines is essential for market transparency. It serves as a benchmark for evaluating terms and prevents anti-competitive practices by clarifying service conditions.

 The RO enhances market operations by making service terms transparent, speeding up negotiations, minimizing disputes, and building trust among providers seeking fair and equitable access to wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines.

d. Cost orientation of fees: The fees charged by STC for the provision of any of the services referred to above (subsection a), must be cost-based, and be supported by cost studies accepted by CST, that may also define the appropriate cost standard or, in its absence, rely on benchmarks for the approval of STC’s tariffs.

 A fair and reasonable tariff for ensuring that wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines remains available to all market participants, maintaining investment incentives and protecting competition. This policy will restrain the STC’s ability to raise prices unjustly.

e. Accounting separation: STC must prepare and submit to CST accounting information on the wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines markets (among others) as further required under the Accounting Separation Regulations and the accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, as these may be amended from time to time.

 Imposing an accounting separation obligation on STC in the wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines markets allows stakeholders to verify its compliance with market regulations, fostering competition and aiding regulatory oversight.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across regulated and unregulated services offered by STC, promoting fair competition. This ensures that costs are attributed accurately and transparently, benefiting consumers and maintaining a level playing field in the telecommunications industry.

6-2-6 M10: Wholesale Access to Trunk Segments of Leased Lines

6-2-6-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is currently subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in the market for the wholesale access to trunk segments of leased lines services and managed network transmission services;

a. Provision of wholesale services for access to trunk segments of leased lines to give access to Ethernet trunk segments of leased lines and to relevant ancillary facilities/services;

b. Non-discrimination;

c. Publication of a reference offer including SLAs and quality of service Information;

d. Cost orientation of fees charged by STC for the provision of any of the services referred to above; and

e. Accounting separation.

6-2-6-2 Key market considerations

Since the 2020 MDDD edition, the market for the wholesale access of the terminating segment of leased lines has seen an increase in the presence of other Service Providers, including wholesalers such as Integrated Dawiyat. Despite this diversification, STC continues to maintain a significant market share, with its self-supply still being the largest purchaser.

The key issues in this market closely align with those previously mentioned for the terminating segments of leased lines, particularly concerning STC’s ongoing dominance. Ethernet service is provided by STC for the trunk segments of leased lines.

In light of these circumstances, it appears reasonable to maintain the existing ex ante remedies imposed on STC. Such measures are crucial for mitigating the risks of excessive pricing, refusal to supply (both generally and specifically concerning Ethernet), and discrimination. Additionally, the concern remains that insufficient regulatory oversight over STC's pricing policy could allow the company to leverage its position. This advantage might be used to subsidize and bolster its already strong or dominant position in adjacent markets or market segments.

6-2-6-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to this wholesale access to trunk segments of leased lines market remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Provision of wholesale services for access to trunk segments of leased lines: Upon reasonable request, STC must provide to any Service Provider licensed to operate a public telecommunications network:

i. Access to Ethernet trunk segments of leased lines, unless requested otherwise by the Service Provider, and

ii. Access to all relevant ancillary facilities/services and collocation space including, when requested and relevant, international capacity.

STC must demonstrate, with proof, that a request by a Service Provider for any of the above services is unreasonable, if STC claims this to be the case.

 Ensuring fair competition through wholesale access to trunk segments of leased lines prevents unfair restrictions or terms, protecting the competitive landscape.

 Facilitating access to these essential trunk segments supports a competitive environment for all SPs.

 Maintaining non-discrimination in wholesale access to trunk segments of leased lines is essential for market fairness, ensuring STC treats all SPs equally.

 Lack of equity in access can compromise market competition and consumer options, hindering the development of alternative networks and affecting service quality.

c. Publication of a reference offer including SLAs and Quality of Service Information: STC must publish periodically a Reference Offer (RO), which must be subject to CST's approval and set out the terms and conditions for the provision of the services defined above (subsection a).

 Issuing a Reference Offer (RO) for wholesale access to trunk segments of leased lines is vital for clear market operations. It establishes a standard for terms and deters anti-competitive behavior by detailing service conditions.

 The update on the RO promotes efficient market functioning by clarifying service terms, facilitating quicker negotiations, reducing disputes, and fostering trust among providers aiming for just access to wholesale access to trunk segments.

 A fair pricing policy for wholesale access to trunk segments ensures universal service accessibility, bolstering investment and safeguarding competition.

e. Accounting separation: STC must prepare and submit to CST accounting information on this, among other, markets, as further required under the Accounting Separation Regulations and the accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, as these may be amended from time to time.

 Implementing accounting separation for STC in the wholesale access to trunk segments of leased line segments is essential for assessing regulatory effectiveness. This clarity enables stakeholders to confirm STC adherence to regulations, enhancing competition and regulatory supervision.

 Such separation ensures transparent and precise cost allocation of the wholesale access to trunk segments products. This fosters equitable competition, directly benefiting consumers and preserving market balance.

6-2-7 M11: Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination

6-2-7-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC is currently subject to the following ex ante remedies, as a result of its designation as dominant in the market for the wholesale mobile access and call origination market;

a. Provision of wholesale mobile access and call origination, including mobile roaming services;

b. Non-discrimination;

c. Transmission of agreements to CST;

d. Cost orientation of fees charged by STC for the provision of any of the services referred to above;

e. Preparation and publication of a reference offer, which should include wholesale mobile roaming services; and

f. Accounting separation.

6-2-7-2 Key market considerations

In the 2020 MDDD edition, remedies concerning wholesale mobile access and call origination were implemented. STC's dominance in this market and its resulting effects on competition are linked to its dominance in adjacent markets. Such dominance escalates the risk of anti-competitive practices, including excessive or predatory pricing, anti-competitive cross-subsidization, and anti-competitive bundling, necessitating the implementation of appropriate ex ante remedies.

6-2-7-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to the wholesale mobile access and call origination remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Provision of wholesale mobile access and call origination: STC is required to provide mobile access and call origination services, including wholesale national roaming services, to all licensees. STC must also supply interconnection links (for both In Span Interconnection and Customer Sited Interconnection).

 Providing wholesale mobile access and call origination, including national roaming, ensures fair competition by preventing STC from limiting access or setting unfair terms, thereby protecting the market's competitive integrity.

b. Non-discrimination: STC is obligated to offer the aforementioned services impartially to all licensees.

 Ensuring non-discrimination in providing wholesale mobile access and call origination is vital for market fairness, requiring STC to treat all telecom providers equally.

 Lack of such fairness could weaken competition and consumer choice, hindering the development of alternative networks and lowering service quality.

c. Transmission of agreements to CST: STC must forward, for CST's review and approval, a copy of any agreement related to wholesale roaming services it concludes with licensees.

 Reviewing agreements for wholesale mobile access and call origination provides CST with critical data for effective market regulation, ensuring compliance with regulatory standards.

 Such oversight confirms STC's adherence to telecommunications regulations, reinforcing market compliance.

d. Cost orientation of fees: The fees charged by STC for the provision of the wholesale services defined above (subsection a), must be cost-based as further determined under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 Fair and reasonable pricing for wholesale mobile access and call origination maintains service accessibility for all, encouraging investment and safeguarding competition.

 This approach prevents STC from unfairly hiking prices, ensuring equitable charges that foster a dynamic and competitive market environment.

e. Publication of a reference offer: STC must prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), which must be subject to CSTs approval and include the provision of the wholesale services defined above (subsection a).

 Publishing a Reference Offer (RO) for wholesale mobile access and call origination is crucial for transparency, setting a standard for terms and preventing anti-competitive practices by detailing service conditions.

 The RO improves market functioning by clarifying service terms, facilitating faster negotiations, reducing disputes, and fostering trust among providers seeking just access to mobile services.

 Imposing an accounting separation obligation monitors the effectiveness of regulatory measures on STC and ensures non-discriminatory practices. This transparency allows stakeholders to verify DSP compliance with market regulations, fostering competition and aiding regulatory oversight.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across wholesale mobile access and call origination products and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

6-2-8 M12: Wholesale Mobile Termination

6-2-8-1 Existing Remedies

Based on the 2020 MDDD edition, STC, Mobily and Zain are subject to the following ex ante remedies as a result of their designation as dominant in this market:

a. Provision of wholesale mobile termination services:

i. Voice call termination services;

ii. Mobile data termination services (SMS, MMS and video calls);

b. Non-discrimination;

c. Submission of transmission of interconnection agreements to CST;

d. Preparation and publication of a reference offer, which should include the following services;

e. Cost-based charges for termination, to be determined by cost or benchmarking studies.

f. For STC only: Accounting separation.

6-2-8-2 Key market considerations

In the 2020 MDDD edition, remedies were deemed necessary to mitigate competitive risks arising from the market positions of all DSPs (STC, Mobily and Zain) in this market, which includes three Mobile Network Operators (MNOs).

As mentioned earlier, all facilities-based Service Providers are currently required to offer symmetrical termination fees, by virtue of horizontal provisions, not linked to the question of dominance.

6-2-8-3 Remedies and rationale

The remedies previously applied to this market remain valid and will continue to be upheld:

a. Provision of wholesale mobile termination services: STC, Mobily and Zain must provide, upon reasonable request by any Service Provider with a right to interconnect to a public telecommunications network in the Kingdom mobile call termination services and associated access facilities required for the provision of such services. STC, Mobily and Zain must demonstrate, with proof, that a request by a Service Provider for any such services is unreasonable, if any of them claim that this is the case.

Such termination must include the termination of voice calls and data (SMS, MMS and video calls).

STC, Mobily and Zain must also provide interconnection links (for both In Span Interconnection and Customer Sited Interconnection), and collocation space for the interconnected Service Providers' interconnection equipment.

 Ensuring wholesale mobile call termination services are accessible to all Service Providers fosters fair competition, preventing DSPs from restricting access or setting unfair terms that could damage the competitive environment.

 This policy supports a competitive marketplace by ensuring essential termination services and associated facilities are available to all telecom providers, enhancing market functionality.

 The transparency and flexibility afforded in accessing these termination services are key to sustaining an equitable market, driving innovation, and delivering benefits to consumers.

b. Non-discrimination: STC, Mobily and Zain must provide mobile call termination services without discrimination between different Service Providers or between other Service Providers and their own affiliates or downstream operations.

 Upholding non-discrimination in providing wholesale mobile termination services is essential for market equity, mandating that DSPs treat all telecom providers equally, including their affiliates.

 Lack of fairness could compromise market competition and consumer options, possibly impeding the development of new networks and diminishing service standards.

c. Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST: STC, Mobily and Zain must forward to CST a copy of any interconnection agreement they conclude for the provision of mobile call termination (possibly among other) services, as further provided under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 Reviewing wholesale mobile termination agreements gives CST vital information for regulating the market and ensuring regulatory compliance.

 This oversight ensures STC, Mobily and Zain's compliance with telecom regulations, affirming their commitment to fair market practices.

 Such scrutiny boosts confidence among stakeholders, showing the market's commitment to fairness, innovation, and growth.

d. Cost orientation of termination fees: The fees charged by STC, Mobily and Zain for the provision of the wholesale mobile call termination services defined above (subsection a), must be cost-based as further determined under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 A fair and reasonable charging requirement ensures that service access remains available to all market participants, maintaining investment incentives and protecting retail competition. With the expectation of increased competition, such a policy will restrain the either STC, Mobily or Zain’s ability to raise prices unjustly, ensuring that the charges remain fair and reasonable while supporting the competitive landscape's evolution.

e. Publication of a reference offer: All three MNOs must prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), which must be subject to CST's approval and include the provision of the wholesale mobile termination services defined above (subsection a). The content of the RO, and the procedure for its preparation and approval must comply with the provisions of the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 Publishing a Reference Offer (RO) for wholesale mobile termination is critical for transparency, setting benchmarks for terms and deterring anti-competitive practices by clarifying service conditions.

 The RO streamlines market operations by clarifying service terms, facilitating faster negotiations, reducing disputes, and fostering trust among providers seeking just access to mobile termination services.

On the grounds of proportionality, the following obligation is imposed on STC only:

 Imposing an accounting separation obligation on STC in the wholesale mobile termination market is crucial for monitoring the effectiveness of regulatory measures and ensuring non-discriminatory practices.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across the wholesale mobile termination market and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

6-2-9 M13: Wholesale MVNO Host Services

6-2-9-1 Existing Remedies

In previous editions of the MDDD report, MVNO Host markets were not examined to establish dominance. At the moment of writing the report, MNOs are the sole providers of wholesale MVNO Host services. CST observes that STC, Mobily and Zain may possess a dominant position in the agreements for MVNO Host services.

6-2-9-2 Key market considerations

MVNOs are highly dependent on agreements with MNOs. MNOs are obligated to provide network access to MVNOs under the Rules and Conditions for MVNO Services and IoT-VNO Services Provision.

However, these obligations have not sufficed to enable MVNOs to establish an adequately independent and dynamic presence in the downstream mobile retail market, which is necessary to intensify competition and make the retail mobile market more competitive.

MVNOs are unable to increase their traffic to a level proportional to their mobile subscriptions. Furthermore, such traffic would likely increase if MVNOs could enjoy greater independence from their host MNOs. Despite new MVNOs entering the market in recent years, existing constraints have curtailed MVNOs' market performance.

6-2-9-3 Remedies and rationale

a. Provision of wholesale MVNO host services: STC, Mobily and Zain are required to provide MVNO Host services to any licensed MVNO requesting access to the MNOs' mobile network, upon a reasonable request. MNOs will have to demonstrate, with proof, that an MVNO's request for such services is unreasonable, should MNOs claim it to be so. MNOs must also furnish interconnection links (for both In Span Interconnection and Customer Sited Interconnection) and collocation space for the MVNOs' interconnection equipment.

 Mandating STC, Mobily and Zain to provide MVNO Host services ensures fair competition, preventing MNOs from denying access or setting harsh terms that negatively impact the market structure.

 This requirement enhances the competitive landscape by ensuring MVNOs have access to necessary mobile network services, supporting a diverse provider ecosystem.

b. Non-discrimination: STC, Mobily and Zain are obligated to offer the aforementioned services impartially among different MVNOs.

 Upholding non-discrimination in providing MVNO Host services is essential for fairness, requiring MNOs to treat all MVNOs equally, including their own operations.

 Lack of fairness could weaken market competition and limit consumer choices, potentially hindering the emergence of new mobile networks and reducing service quality.

c. Transmission of agreements to CST: STC, Mobily and Zain must forward to CST, for review and approval, a copy of any agreement they conclude with an MVNO for mobile access and call origination. This process must adhere to the procedures outlined for interconnection agreements in the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities and the Rules and Conditions for MVNO Services and IoT-VNO Service Provision.

 Reviewing MVNO Host service agreements provides CST essential insights for effective market regulation and ensures adherence to regulatory standards.

 Such examination strengthens stakeholder trust, reflecting the market's dedication to fairness, innovation, and expansion.

d. Cost orientation of fees: The fees charged by STC, Mobily and Zain for providing the wholesale services mentioned above must be cost-based, as specified under the Interconnection Regulations and the Regulations for Access to Physical Facilities.

 Implementing fair and reasonable charges for MVNO Host services ensures accessibility for all market participants, encouraging investment and safeguarding competition. This policy prevents MNOs from excessively increasing prices, maintaining equitable fees that support a competitive market environment.

e. Publication of a reference offer: STC, Mobily and Zain are required to prepare and publish a Reference Offer (RO), which must receive CST's approval and encompass the provision of the wholesale services detailed above.

 Publishing a Reference Offer (RO) for MVNO Host services is crucial for transparency, acting as a standard for term evaluation and preventing anti-competitive practices by detailing service conditions.

 The RO improves market functionality by clarifying service terms, facilitating quicker negotiations, reducing disputes, and fostering trust among MVNOs seeking just and equitable access to mobile network services.

On the grounds of proportionality, the following obligation is imposed on STC only:

f. Accounting separation: STC must compile and submit to CST accounting information on this and other markets as mandated by the Accounting Separation Regulations and its accompanying Guidelines and Rules for Accounting Separation, subject to future amendments.

 Imposing an accounting separation obligation on STC for the MVNO Host Services market is crucial for monitoring the effectiveness of regulatory measures and ensuring non-discriminatory practices. This transparency allows stakeholders to verify STC’s compliance with market regulations, fostering competition and aiding regulatory oversight.

 Accounting separation prevents unfair cross-subsidization across MVNO Host services and other unregulated products, promoting fair competition.

Appendix

Public Consultation questions

8. Public Consultation questions

1. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the retail fixed access and fixed calls market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

2. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the retail fixed broadband market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

3. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the retail FTTx broadband sub-market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

4. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the retail leased lines market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

5. Do you endorse the inclusion of B2B and B2G in the same market for retail leased lines? Do you agree with the results of the Three Criteria Test for the retail leased lines market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

6. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the retail mobile services market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

7. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of wholesale local access and physical infrastructure market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

8. Considering the current market conditions, do you agree it would be beneficial to establish a sub market specifically for towers services within wholesale local access and physical infrastructure?

9. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale fixed broadband access market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

10. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale transit market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

11. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale fixed call termination market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

12. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale market for the terminating segments of leased lines? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

13. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale market for the trunk segments of leased lines? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

14. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale mobile access and call origination market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

15. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale mobile termination market? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

16. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary definition of the wholesale MVNO Host services market If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

17. Do you endorse CST's preliminary definition of the geographical scope for wholesale markets? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

18. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary view that the following retail markets are susceptible to ex ante regulation: retail fixed access and calls; retail fixed broadband; retail FTTx broadband sub-market, retail leased lines? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

19. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary view that the following wholesale markets are susceptible to ex ante regulation: wholesale local access and physical infrastructure; wholesale broadband access; wholesale transit services wholesale fixed call termination; wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines; wholesale access to trunk segments of leased lines; wholesale mobile access and call origination; wholesale mobile termination; wholesale MVNO host services. If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

20. Do you endorse CST’s preliminary assessment of dominance? If you have a different perspective, please provide your reasoning and substantiate it with supporting information.

Last update: 14 September 2024

*Relevant market*	*Expected types of damage arising from dominance in market*	*Guiding Ex-ante regulation*
1. Retail markets	High prices, anti competitive prices, mutual support. etc.	Submitting tariff to CST for approval Tariff notification Cost studies Regulating price caps Accounting separation
	Unfair terms and conditions, asymmetric information, monopolizing subscribers, etc.	Obligations related to the confidentiality of the information of the subscriber Terms of service
	Decrease in quality Limited innovation	·Service quality
2. Wholesale markets	Decrease in quality Limited innovation	Service quality
	Unfair terms and conditions, information asymmetry, monopolizing subscribers, etc.	Obligations related to the confidentiality of the information of the subscriber Terms of service
	High prices, anti- competitive prices, mutual support (incl. collusion between service providers), etc.	Interconnection fees Access to physical facilities fees Cost studies Accounting separation Submitting tariff to CST for approval Reference offer
	Rejecting or delaying the provision of services, unfair terms and conditions, etc.	Interconnection services offer Access to physical facilities services offer Wholesale services reference offer Wholesale agreements
	Partiality to support retail services related to the service provider	Effective structural separation between business units Reference offer

Criteria	Definition
One-network	It refers to regions where a single Service Provider exclusively serves the entire region. This criterion is significant in determining dominance, as it identifies situations where a Service Provider is the sole operator in those areas, thereby establishing a strong position of market control and influence.
Effectively one-network	It refers to networks where there may be infrastructure available for multiple Service Providers, but either at the time of analysis, it is not activated, or the presence of additional Service Providers is significantly smaller compared to the dominant Service Provider. In such cases, despite the potential for multiple operators, the dominant Service Provider still maintains a substantial advantage in terms of infrastructure and market presence.
Two or more networks	It refers to networks where two or more Service Providers (SPs) serve the region. In these regions, there is a presence of multiple SPs, indicating a level of competition and choice for consumers.

Criteria according to the Bylaw	Article
Whether the Service Provider, alone or jointly with other Service Providers, owns an economic position that enables him to act independently from competitors or users. It shall also take into account as a minimum, the following:	Article 51.1
To what extent the Service Provider has exclusive or predominant control over basic service provision facilities or telecommunications or information technology facilities providing him with access to users;	Article 51.1.a
Total revenues of a telecommunications or information technology market identified as a dominant Service Provider in that market, unless CST decides otherwise;	Article 51.1.b
Natural size of barriers to market access;	Article 51.1.c
Service Provider's market share;	Article 51.1.d
Number and market shares of other Service Providers;	Article 51.1.e
Service Provider's pricing behavior and his ability to take the lead in determining same; and	Article 51.1.f
Ability to provide an acceptable alternative service.	Article 51.1.g
CST shall classify a Service Provider as a dominant Service Provider for the purposes of interconnection or access to one or more telecommunications or information technology markets, as per the following:	Article 27.1
If the definition and concept of the dominant Service Provider set out in Paragraph (2) of Article 15 of the Law applies to a Service Provider;	Article 27.1.a
If a Service Provider has agreed with another Service Provider to make them enjoy a position equal to that of the dominant Service Provider referred to in Paragraph (2) of Article 15 in the Law	Article 27.1.b

Criteria set out in the Designation of Markets and Dominance in Telecommunications Sector Regulation	Article
Significant market power: whether the Service Provider, unilaterally, or through agreement with other Service Providers, has the ability to exercise Significant Market Power in any market in which it provides services pursuant to its license.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-1
Market Concentration: The level of market concentration, as indicated by revenues, the number of subscribers, or other pertinent metrics.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-2
Market Shares Over Time: The trend of market shares among telecommunications Service Providers over time.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-3
Tariff Variations Over Time: The extent to which a Service Provider's tariffs have fluctuated over time.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-4
Above-Normal Profits: The ability of a Service Provider to generate profits that exceed the normal range.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-5
Financial Resources and Access to Capital: The Service Provider's financial standing and its ability to secure financing.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-6
The technological advantages and superiority: the ability of the telecommunications Service Provider to benefit from technologies that competitors cannot benefit from.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-7
Preferential contracts: the ability of the telecommunications Service Provider to obtain contracts with preferential nature or that are long-term to provide relevant services to key users.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-8
The overall size of the Service Provider: in terms of its market share, revenues, assets, or other measures of economic strength, relative to its competitors and the overall market.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-9
The control of infrastructure not easily duplicated: such as essential facilities, networks, platforms, or technologies, that give the Service Provider a competitive advantage or create barriers to entry or expansion for other Service Providers.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-10
The network effects: the positive feedback effects that arise when the value or utility of a product or service increases with the number or size of its users or customers, and that may create or reinforce market power or lock-in effects.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-11
The absence of or low countervailing buying power: the ability of customers or consumers to exert pressure on the Service Provider by switching to alternative suppliers, negotiating better terms and conditions, or sponsoring the entry or expansion of other Service Providers.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-12
The economies of scale: the cost advantages that enable the Service Provider to achieve and retain a position of advantage and possibly of dominance in a market.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-13
The economies of scope: when the range of businesses and operations of an enterprise allow it to spread its fixed common and overhead costs across the full range of its services.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-14
Vertical Integration: measured based on the control or influence of the Service Provider over different stages of the production or distribution chain that may give it a competitive advantage or create barriers to entry or expansion for other Service Providers.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-15
Highly developed distribution and sales network: may give the Service Provider a competitive advantage or create barriers to entry or expansion for other Service Providers.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-16
Absence of potential competition: measured by the lack of credible or effective threats of entry or expansion by new or existing Service Providers.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-17
Barriers to expansion: assessed by the obstacles or difficulties faced by the Service Provider's competitors.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-18
Ease of market entry: evaluated based on the feasibility and cost of entering the relevant market by new Service Providers.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-19
Excess pricing and profitability: measured by the profitability of the Service Provider in the relevant market compared to the profitability that might be expected.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-20
Lack of active competition on non-price factors: such as quality, variety, innovation, or service, that may indicate the existence or exercise of market power or the lack of effective pressure from customers.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-21
Switching barriers: measured by the costs or difficulties faced by customers or consumers to change their supplier or product.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-22
Customers' ability to access and use information: the availability and quality of the information on the products, services, prices, or terms and conditions.	Appendix 1: Article 2-1-23

Summary of Remedy	Relevant provisions in the Bylaw
Applying identical conditions and non-discriminatory prices for interconnection or access when interconnection circumstances are similar;	Article 28.1
Providing interconnection or access with the same terms and quality of service as those applicable to his services or affiliates;	Article 28.2
Providing all the necessary information and specifications required by the Service Provider for the purpose of interconnection or access;	Article 28.3
Restricting the use of the information received from the Service Provider to the purposes of interconnection or access only, and avoiding disclosure thereof to departments, persons or affiliates for whom said information may provide a competitive edge.	Article 28.4
General principles for studying costs and regulating price tariffs;	Article 105.1
Provisions relating to tariff requests and to obligations of universal Service Provider, Dominant Service Provider, or any other Service Provider;	Article 105.2
Exceptions related to these provisions in proportion to the nature of activities in the sector, taking into account the forces of competition and the protection of user interests;	Article 105.3
Provisions relating to preferential tariffs;	Article 105.4
Any other provisions and requirements achieving the objectives stipulated in Article 2 of the Law.	Article 105.5

Relevant Markets	Dominant Service Providers	Ex ante remedies
M1: Retail Fixed Access and Fixed Calls	STC	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M2: Retail Fixed Broadband Services	STC	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M2.1: Retail FTTx Broadband Services	STC	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M3: Retail Leased Lines	STC	Price controls Cost studies by STC Technical and economic replicability test for bundles Accounting separation Bundling allowed only subject to conditions
M5: Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure	At the national level: STC, Tawal, Center3 & Integrated Dawiyat CST has the authority to designate a Service Provider as dominant in a region if it meets the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.3	Provision of access services to the physical infrastructure Non-discrimination Transmission of any DSP agreements on physical local fixed access services to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only) Unbundling of services Amendments to existing services
M6: Wholesale Broadband Access	At the national level STC & Integrated Dawiyat CST has the authority to designate a Service Provider as dominant in a region if it meets the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.3	Provision of wholesale fixed broadband access services Non-discrimination Transmission of any DSP agreements on wholesale fixed broadband access services to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only) Unbundling of services Amendments to existing services
M7: Wholesale Transit Services	STC, Center3	Provision of wholesale transit services Non-discrimination Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation
M8: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination	STC, Mobily, Zain, Salam and Go	Provision of wholesale fixed call termination services Non-discrimination Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST Cost orientation of termination fees Publication of a reference offer (STC only) Accounting separation (STC only) Prohibition to charge higher fees than those of STC (other SPs)
M9: Wholesale Access to Terminating Segments of Leased Lines	STC	Provision of wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines Non-discrimination Publication of a reference offer Cost orientation of fees Accounting separation
M10: Wholesale Access to Trunk Segments of Leased Lines	STC	Provision of wholesale services for access to trunk segments of leased lines Non-discrimination Publication of a reference offer Cost orientation of fees Accounting separation
M11: Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination	STC	Provision of wholesale mobile access and call origination Non-discrimination Transmission of agreements to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation
M12: Wholesale Mobile Termination	STC, Mobily, Zain	Provision of wholesale mobile call termination services Non-discrimination Transmission of interconnection agreements to CST Cost orientation of termination fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only)
M13: Wholesale MVNO Host Services	STC, Mobily, Zain	Provision of wholesale MVNO host services Non-discrimination Transmission of agreements to CST Cost orientation of fees Publication of a reference offer Accounting separation (STC only)

Relevant Markets	Scope of services includes, but it not limited to, the following:
M1: Retail Fixed Access and Fixed Calls	Access provided over copper Access provided over fiber Access provided over FWA Switched voice calls Managed VoIP calls Calls to domestic destinations Calls to international destinations Access provided to residential customers Access provided to non-residential customers Calls provided to residential customers Calls provided to business customers
M2: Retail Fixed Broadband Services	Retail broadband services provided over fiber Retail broadband services provided over FWA Retail broadband services provided over xDSL Retail broadband services provided to non-residential customers Retail broadband services provided to residential customers FTTx Broadband services
M2.1: Retail FTTx Broadband	Fiber to the Business (FTTB) Broadband services Fiber to the Home (FTTH) Broadband services Fiber to the Room (FTTR) Broadband services
M3: Retail Leased Lines	Services include but not limited to: Leased lines circuits Dedicated internet access (DIA) Shared Internet Access Virtual Private Network (VPN over Internet) Static IP Addresses Software defined wide area network (SD-WAN) Point-to-point capacity Hub (point-to-multipoint) capacity Transponder capacity Dark Fiber Layer 2 Connectivity Service (Ethernet) Layer 3 Connectivity Service (IP VPN) Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM) International Private Leased Circuit (IPLC) Service Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) Transmission Service Fixed Broadband Access To Private Network/Cloud Cloud Services Voice over IP (VoIP) Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) trunking Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) Voice Service
M5: Wholesale Local Access and Physical Infrastructure	Equipment Collocation for Interconnection Services Dark fiber In-Building Solution (IBS) Sharing Service Data Center (DC) Services Metro Connect Service In Span Interconnection Link Service Private Peering Service Interconnection Link Services Customer Sited Interconnection Link Service Customer Sited Interconnection Link Service (IP interconnection) Ducts Service Coverage as a Service (CaaS) Fiber to the Tower Service (FTTT)
M6: Wholesale Broadband Access	Wholesale Bitstream Access Service Wholesale Bitstream Access – Fiber to the home (FTTH) Wholesale Bitstream Access – Fiber to the Business (FTTB) Wholesale Bitstream Access - xDSL
M7: Wholesale Transit Services	Self-supply of transit services Transit of international traffic originating in the KSA Transit of national traffic originating in the KSA Transit of traffic up to and including international gateways Wholesale International Voice Call Services Wholesale Outgoing International Voice Call Service Wholesale Incoming International Voice Call Service Calls To Emergency Services Directory Enquiry Services Wholesale Transit Interconnection Service Wholesale Fixed Intelligent Call Origination Service IP Transit Service IP Transit Service (Internet Port) Wholesale International Transmission Capacity Service (IPLC)
M8: Wholesale Fixed Call Termination	Termination of all types of call Termination of calls from fixed operators Termination of calls from mobile operators Wholesale Fixed Call Termination Service to stc Geographic Number Ranges Call Termination Service to stc Non-Geographic Number Ranges Ancillary Services Calls To Emergency Services Directory Enquiry Services
M9: Wholesale Access to Terminating Segments of Leased Lines	Wholesale Leased Line Services Wholesale National Leased Line Service Wholesale National Leased Line Service (CNFO) Wholesale National Terminating Segments of Leased Lines Service (L2VPN) and (L3VPN) Wholesale National Terminating Segments of Leased Service Dedicated Internet Access (DIA) service
M10: Wholesale Access to Trunk Segments of Leased Lines	Wholesale National Trunk Segments of Leased Lines Service Wholesale International Transmission Capacity Service (IPLC)
M11: Wholesale Mobile Access and Call Origination	Self-supply by mobile operators Wholesale national roaming service Wholesale call origination, video-call, SMS and MMS origination services Wholesale Mobile Intelligent Call Origination Service Pure Resale of Telecommunications Services Bulk SMS Service Coverage as a Service (CaaS)
M12: Wholesale Mobile Termination	Termination of all types of call Termination of calls from all fixed operators Termination of calls from all mobile operators Wholesale Mobile Call Termination Service SMS Termination Service MMS Termination Service Wholesale Video Call Termination Service Equipment Collocation for Interconnection Services In Span Interconnection Link Service Interconnection Link Services Customer Sited Interconnection Link Service Customer Sited Interconnection Link Service (IP interconnection) Ancillary Services Calls To Emergency Services Directory Enquiry Services
M13: Wholesale MVNO Host Services	MVNO Hosting Service For MVNOs: Wholesale call origination, video-call, SMS and MMS origination services Termination of Services Bulk SMS Data traffic